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Abstract
This study has been performed to understand the potential impact that the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission’s (FERC) Order No. 841 will have on the adoption of
energy storage resources (ESR). This analysis looked at: (1) the Order’s requirements,
(2) FERC’s exercise of its authorized jurisdiction within the Order, and (3) actions taken
by the Regional Transmission Organizations (RTO), Independent System Operators
(ISO) and FERC to demonstrate compliance with the Order’s requirements:
Order No. 841 utilizes a participation model to ensure ESR’s are able to participate in
wholesale electricity markets to an extent that is reflective of a resource’s physical and
operation characteristics. The model’s effect on market competition will be achieved
primarily through a greater realization of merchant value by ESR owners. However,
economically optimal levels of ESR capacity and service provision will likely not be
achieved through exclusive use of participation models.
Realization of ESR benefits will be heavily dependent on the long-term resilience of the
market changes implemented by the Order. FERC’s reliance on a conventional
exercise of its jurisdiction over interstate wholesale markets can creating unnecessary
regulatory uncertainty, or miss opportunities for State-level engagement to maintain the
momentum that Order No. 841 provides to ESR participation.
Key aspects of the RTO/ISO’s compliance plans were tabulated and analyzed.
RTO/ISO’s may need to further justify the use of proposed indirect controls to manage
ESR physical parameters. Additionally, the widespread use of “dispatch-only”
participation models may present participation barriers for some storage technologies.
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Chapter 1 Electricity Storage and Wholesale Electricity Markets
1.1

Early Federal Regulatory Considerations

In June, 2010, the Director of the Office of Energy Policy and Innovation (OEPI) opened
Docket No. AD10-13-000 to gather comments pertinent to rates, accounting and
financial reporting for new electric storage technologies. The OEPI, an office within the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), is tasked with coordinating “the
development of policies and rules that address emerging challenges” relevant to the
electric industry (FERC, 2019a). Aspects of this coordination include provision of policy
recommendations derived from energy market analysis, as well as identification of
regulatory barriers to greater implementation of innovations in the electric industry. In
this docket, OEPI and, by extension, FERC acknowledged the growing technological
maturity and commercial operation of newer storage technologies, and sought to
understand how to “develop rates and categorize electric storage costs for rate
purposes” (FERC, 2010).
Participation of these new storage technologies in electric markets within the scope of
FERC’s jurisdiction (i.e., interstate wholesale markets), was not viewed as a simple
exercise of mimicking the treatment of existing electric system elements (FERC, 2010).
For example, pumped hydroelectric storage (PHES), had provided energy storage
within the US electric system for approximately 80 years by the time Docket No. AD1013-000 was opened. For much of this time, PHES resources did not represent a novel
component of the grid or require innovative compensation methods for provision of
services. In fact, this class of storage resources was primarily developed to occupy the
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traditional role of a transmission-level interconnected energy generation asset. As
illustrated in Figure 1-1, most of the current US PHES capacity was commissioned in
the 1960’s and 1970’s in order to provide peak energy in place of fossil fuel generation
as a response to energy shortages that occurred starting in the 1960’s (Barbour,
Wilson, Radcliffe, Ding, & Li, 2016; Uria-Martinez, Johnson, & O'Connor, 2018; Yang &
Jackson, 2011).

Figure 1-1: Growth of US PHES Capacity
(USDOE, 2018)1
With the PHES capacity owned and operated under the vertically integrated utility model
dominant at the time, mechanisms beyond the standard cost-of-service model were also
not needed to compensate PHES participation in wholesale markets (FERC, 2010).
The size, capacity and siting flexibility provided by newer storage technologies, in

1

Commissioning dates for the Hiwassee Dam and the Rocky Mountain Hydroelectric Plant were not
included in (USDOE, 2018), and were separately obtained (EIA, 2019b).
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addition to lower capital costs, allowed these new storage classes to potentially inhabit
any of the traditional electric system asset categories (i.e., generation-, transmission-,
and distribution-level) in addition to serving in roles usually attributed to system loads.
The Commission subsequently undertook several rule making efforts impacting electric
storage resource participation in wholesale markets, presumably informed by the
insights gleaned from the 2010 Request for Comments. These efforts, while steps in
the right direction to removing barriers to such participation, essentially nibbled around
the edges of the physical and operational capabilities of electric storage resources.
Specifically, two resulting final rules addressed storage resource compensation (FERC,
2011c, 2013a) for ancillary services only. A third rule was limited to including electric
storage devices in the pro forma interconnection agreements and procedures for Small
Generators (FERC, 2013b), defined as “devices used for the production of electricity
having a capacity of no more than 20 megawatts” (FERC, 2005).
1.2

Intervening Energy Storage Innovations and Evolution: 2010 – 2016

The intervening years had seen continued changes related to electric storage: (1) a
range of cost-effective electric storage projects became operational from 2010-2016
leveraging a variety of storage technologies, (2) state-level mandates for storage
procurement had been implemented in various states, and (3) an evolving realization of
electric storage’s capability to facilitate increased renewable energy penetration.
Specific examples of these changes are further detailed below.
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Commissioning of New Commercial Storage Technologies
Figure 1-2 provides an overview of evolving distribution of storage technologies that
was being commissioned in the US between 2010 and 2016. The total nameplate
storage capacity only increased by approximately 10% over this period. At the same
time, new categories of storage technologies, as well as new variants of existing
storage technology categories became sufficiently mature to achieve commercialization.
While each still represented less than 1% of the nation’s 2016 electric storage capacity,
flywheel (mechanical and concentrated solar generation coupled with molten salt
storage projects both moved from demonstration stages into the realm of larger-scale
commercialized assets. Advances in materials science (e.g., carbon fiber rotor
fabrication) and flywheel design enabled the commissioning of flywheel facilities with up
to 20 MW capacity in New York and Pennsylvania starting in 2011. Only two years
later, new heat transfer fluids (i.e., molten salts) were deployed in 2013 in the first
operational US commercial concentrated solar facility to be coupled with storage in
order to provide more reliable energy supply through all hours of the day.
Introduction of battery storage followed a somewhat different path, but the maturing of
relevant technologies still resulting in the converging introduction of new commercial
storage resources during the early 2010’s. Batteries providing storage in the form of
electrochemical energy were available prior to the creation of the US electric grid in the
late nineteenth century; rechargeable lead-acid batteries were first invented in 1859,
whereas Edison’s Pearl Street Station, the first commercial central power state in the
US, began generation in 1882. However, there are limited examples prior to 2010
where such batteries were used in larger-scale generator-type roles. In such cases,
4|Page

Figure 1-2: Comparison of 2010 and 2016 Operational US Storage Capacity
(EIA, 2010, 2016b)
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storage media based on lead-acid and sodium-sulfur chemistries were the primary type
of battery technology employed. With the maturity of lithium-based batteries after 2010,
the majority of new storage resource installations in the US, covering a wide range of
facility capacities, have utilized a variety of lithium-based technologies. Other battery
storage technologies have also been commercialized (e.g., flow batteries), but lithiumbased batteries have truly come to dominate the battery storage landscape,
representing almost two-thirds of current operational battery installations (DOE
database).
State-Level Storage Mandates
From 2010 through early 2018, state-level legislative action began to focus on the
introduction of storage procurement targets. These legislative efforts were aimed at
state entities authorized to regulate aspects of the state electricity markets, and typically
took the form of directives to assess the benefit of storage procurement mandates, and
where deemed necessary, to establish specific target procurement levels and timelines.
As detailed in Table 1-1, by the end of 2017, five states had either tasked their state
regulatory boards with assessing procurement targets or targets had been established,
with achievement of the targets occurring no later than 2020.
Facilitation of Higher Renewable Energy Penetration Levels
During this period, a variety of real-world experiences provided a window into the needs
of an electric grid attempting to achieve high levels of renewable energy penetration.
Renewable generation resources such as wind and solar generation require the
introduction of additional levels of system flexibility to counterbalance the intermittent
nature of the associated generation (Kristov, 2015). Conventional electric grid elements
6|Page

Table 1-1: State-Level Electric Storage Legislation and Mandates Enacted Prior to 2018
State

Legislative
Bill

California

AB2514

AB2868

Effective Date
Sept 29, 2010

Sept 26, 2016

Mandate Details

Reference

California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) is
directed to determine appropriate targets for each loadserving entity to procure energy storage systems to be
achieved by 2015 and 2020

(AB2514, 2010)

CPUC set procurement target of 1325 MW by 2020

(CPUC, 2013)

The CPUC can approve up to 500 MW of distributionconnected or behind-the-meter (BTM) energy storage.

(AB2868, 2016)

No more than 25% of energy storage capacity can be
provided by BTM energy storage
Oregon

HB2193

Jun 10, 2015

Electric companies with at least 25000 retail customers
to procure one or more energy storage system with a
capacity of at least 5MWh energy by Jan, 2020

(HB 2193, 2015)

Massachusetts

H.4568

Aug 8, 2016

Department of Energy Resources is directed to
determine whether to set January, 2020 procurement
targets for energy storage systems

(H. 4568, 2016)

Nevada

SB204

Jul 1, 2017

Nevada Public Utilities Commission is directed to
determine, on or before October 1, 2018, whether to
establish biennial energy storage procurement targets

(SB204, 2017)

New York

AB6571

Mar 9, 2017

New York Public Service Commission is directed to set
a 2030 target for storage procurement

(A6571, 2017)

Set a target of 1325 GW by 2020.

(NYDPS, 2018)
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can be leveraged to provide generation- or transmission-related flexibility. For example,
Germany’s energy transition efforts (i.e., Energiewende) enable generation of 27% of all
electricity from renewable sources by 2014, while continuing to work towards supplying
80% of electricity from renewable sources (Pollitt & Anaya, 2016). In this case, system
flexibility was provided by leveraging existing robust transmission capacity to
neighboring countries that accommodated export of excess generation and reduced the
need to curtail wind and solar generation.
Conversely, regions with existing constraints preventing over-reliance on such
conventional solutions must instead seek alternate approaches to ensuring sufficient
grid flexibility is maintained as the transition to greater renewable energy occurs.
Introduction of electric storage resources is one path that can be taken to provide
sufficient system flexibility. New York State’s launch the Reforming the Energy Vision in
2014 (New York State, 2019) provides such an example. Seeking to create a cleaner,
more resilient and affordable energy system for New York, the program has established
a target to obtain 50% of all electricity from renewable energy sources by 2030.
However, significant transmission constraints exist within the state, preventing the
abundant upstate, zero-emission resources from being available for use in the
downstate region where fossil fuels generation provided close to three quarters of all
electricity generation in 2016 (NYISO, 2017). One approach that New York taken to
address reliability concerns associated with high renewable energy penetration was to
explicitly include energy storage procurement targets in their planning to achieve the
2030 renewable energy goals.
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1.3

Issuance of Order No. 841

The Commission found itself concurrently engaged in issuing orders on a case-by-case
basis that impacted aspects of electric storage wholesale market participation (FERC,
2016)2. The final rules pertaining to storage resource compensation for ancillary
services mentioned above are two such examples (FERC, 2011c, 2013a). Also, some
Independent System Operators (ISO’s) and Regional Transmission Organizations
(RTO’s) had independently begun work on wholesale market tariff updates that would
permit broader electric storage resources to provide a broad range of grid services3. In
whole, these technical, regulatory and economic developments caused concern within
FERC that storage resources were facing “barriers that limit them from participating in
organized wholesale electric markets” (FERC, 2016)4.
Moving forward to November 2016, FERC issued a Notice for Proposed Rulemaking
(NOPR) seeking to address a broader, more ambitious goal; a general effort to remove
barriers to participation of electric storage resources in organized wholesale electric
markets (FERC, 2016)5. Following receipt of stakeholder comments on the proposed
rule elements in the NOPR and the subsequent rule draft, the Final Rule, as detailed in
Order No. 841 (Electric Storage Participation in Markets Operated by Regional
Transmission Organizations and Independent System Operators), was published in the

2

At Paragraph 6
As will be discussed in Chapter 4, the California Independent System Operator (CAISO) had worked for
a number of years on developing the new Non-Generator Resource (NGR), which was designed
specifically for energy storage resources.
4 At Paragraph 7
5 The 2016 Notice of Proposed Rulemaking also sought to remove barriers to wholesale electricity market
participation of distributed energy resource aggregations. FERC indicated in the Final Rule for Order No.
841 that further efforts to define rules for aggregations would be moved to a separate docket, as
discussed in Section 2.4: Key Out-of-Scope Topics
3
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Federal Register on March 6, 2018, and became effective on June 4, 2018 (FERC,
2018). In line with the compliance requirements, RTO/ISO’s were required to submit
compliance plan six months after the Final Rule’s effective date to demonstrate that
their proposal will satisfy the associated requirements. RTO/ISO’s are then permitted
twelve months after the compliance plan filing to implement their respective proposed
market reforms detailed in the plans.
1.4

Research Topic Overview

The goal of this project is to begin to develop an understanding of the potential impact
that Order No. 841’s Final Rule will have on the participation of electric storage
resources (ESR) in US wholesale electricity markets. This is a timely topic, given that
the Order only became effective within the past year, and RTO/ISO’s have yet to
receive approval of the compliance plans submitted in early December, 2018.
The method by which this understanding can begin to be established will consist of
analyzing the components of the Order, the Commission’s exercise of its authorized
jurisdiction within the Order, and the actions taken by the RTO/ISO’s and FERC to
demonstrate compliance with the Final Rule requirements:
1. Final Rule Requirements and Participation Model Effectiveness: The key
requirements contained within the Final Rule will be outlined. This assessment
will be accompanied by a consideration of unresolved topics determined to be
out of scope of the Final Rule that may represent significant future challenges to
the envisioned electric storage participation. The use of participation models as
a means of enabling optimal provision of grid services by electric storage
10 | P a g e

resources will be reviewed in order to the determine the likelihood of the Final
Rule being suitable for its intended purpose.
2. Final Rule Legal Foundations and Jurisdictional Perspectives: FERC’s
jurisdictional claims outlined in the Final Rule will be identified and discussed in
the context of relevant precedents, including previous judicial decisions and
similar Commission-issued rules. The ability of FERC’s approach to jurisdictional
claims to provide a sustainable regulatory regime will be discussed along with
potential challenges faced by the modern electric grid arising from such
approaches.
3. RTO/ISO Compliance Plans and Initial Commission Responses: Key aspects
of the recently proposed compliance plans will be summarized to identify and
categorize approaches taken to achieve compliance with the Final Rule by the
RTO/ISO’s. These plans will also be reviewed in the context of the compliance
deficiency letters recently issued by FERC as an avenue to gain insight on the
likely viability of the proposed plans.
It is critical to broaden the understanding of the viability and impact of these Orderdriven changes on the rate of ESR adoption, and by extension, increased renewable
energy penetration on a national level. This interaction amongst resilience of the Final
Rule requirements, wholesale market participation and continued ESR adoption is
therefore of interest to all stakeholders impacted by renewable energy resource
adoption: ESR developers and owners, energy policy and regulatory bodies at the state
and federal levels, energy customers, and transmission/distribution/generation system
owners.
11 | P a g e

Chapter 2 Overview of FERC Order No. 841
2.1

Introduction

An understanding of the elements of Order No. 841, is critical to assessing the impact it
will have on the adoption of electric storage resources in the US electric system.
However, such Orders provided by the Commission are not just a simple prescriptive list
of instructions for impacted entities to follow. The Orders also provide key stakeholder
comments taken into consideration when formulating the Commission’s determinations
on specific aspects of the Order. Additional interpretive details and clarifications are
typically provided to aid in the execution the Order’s requirements. Such additional
information serves as a demonstration that the associated prescriptions are neither
arbitrary nor capricious (i.e., avoiding the risk of subsequent judicial review for
lawfulness), while enabling consistent compliance by entities falling within FERC’s
jurisdiction on the relevant matters.
Despite such intentions, the richness of content present in many of the Commission’s
Orders can be daunting to more casual readers, or obscure critical details central to a
more focused analysis. In an effort to establish a relatively concise foundation on which
subsequent analytical discussions will be built, an initial summarization and
classification of the Order’s elements provides a beneficial first step towards achieving
the current study’s goals. As such, this chapter will provide a summary of: (1) the
elements and requirements of Order No. 841, and (2) key unresolved items related to
future storage resource participation. Additionally, the modes by which FERC’s focus
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on participation models in the Order can impact energy storage capacity deployment will
be discussed.
2.2

Tariff Revisions and Participation Models

At a high level, the Final Rule issued in Order No. 841 (referred to subsequently in this
Chapter as the “Final Rule”) simply requires an update to existing tariffs maintained by
the nation’s RTO’s and ISO’s by incorporating an additional participation model. With
this in mind, the roles of tariffs and participation models, as used in wholesale electric
markets, deserve some further discussion.
RTO/ISO’s maintain tariffs that outline provided services, rates and charges for those
services, and rules and regulations affecting these services, rates and charges. These
tariffs are required to be filed with, and are subject to hearings for lawfulness by FERC
(Federal Power Act, 1935). It is within these tariffs that the RTO/ISO’s set forth
wholesale market operational and participation procedures for defined services. The
Final Rule explicitly revises FERC regulations to require RTO/ISO’s to update their
current tariffs to include market rules facilitating participation of a new resource: Electric
Storage Resource.
In the context of wholesale electric markets, FERC refers to participation models as
tariff provisions that are applicable to a specific class of resources. These provisions
are included when a class of resources requires distinctive treatment in order to
accommodate or leverage its unique physical or operational characteristics (FERC,
2018)6. The Commission views implementation of such models as a mechanism for

6

At Paragraph 3
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removing barriers to participation, enhancing competition, and ensuring just and
reasonable prices (FERC, 2018)7.
Four required elements of the participation model were stipulated within the Final Rule.
These elements are summarized in Table 2-1. An additional general tariff revision was
also stipulated that is related to the prices at which ESR’s are to be charged for energy
purchased for later resale within the wholesale market.
Table 2-1: ESR Participation Model Elements
Element Name

Element Description

Service provision
eligibility

Assurance of ESR eligibility to provide all wholesale market
services (i.e., energy, capacity and ancillary services) that it
is technically capable of providing

Wholesale market
price setting

Assurance that ESR’s can be dispatched and set the market
price as the marginal energy injecting of withdrawing
resources (i.e., as both a buyer and a seller of electric
market services)

Market bidding
parameters

Accounting for physical and operational characteristics of
the ESR in market bidding parameters

Establishes a minimum resource capacity, above which
Minimum resource size RTO/ISO’s must allow qualifying resources to use the ESR
participation model
2.2.1 ESR Definition, Qualification and General Participation
The first required element of the ESR participation model focuses more on the basic
aspects of ESR’s and foundational concepts to be achieved by the participation models.
The key aspects of this element include: (1) defining an ESR, (2) outlining requirements

7

At Paragraph 4
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to qualify a resource as an ESR, (3) an understanding of technical capability within the
context of the Final Rule, and (4) the relationship between various participation models
that may already be available to storage resources.
ESR Definition
Prior to proscribing detailed elements of the new participation model, the Final Rule
establishes an explicit definition for ESR’s to clarify which resources may utilize the
associated participation model (FERC, 2018)8. The Final Rule thus provides the
following definition:
Electric Storage Resource: A resource capable of receiving electric energy from the
grid and storing it for later injection of electric energy back to the grid.
Incorporated within this definition are two implied elements. First, the definition lacks
any mention of underlying storage technology or medium, but instead focuses only on
the capability to withdraw, store and inject energy to the grid. Thus, this effectively
technology-agnostic definition should remain relevant as new storage technologies are
developed and commercialized. Second, the definition does not proscribe the location
in which an ESR can reside within the electric system. Any storage resource, whether
interconnected at the transmission-, distribution- or behind-the-meter-level, is capable of
meeting the ESR definition and utilizing the corresponding participation model for
wholesale electricity sales. However, while providing wholesale market participation
opportunities for a wide range of storage resources, as will be discuss in Chapter 4, this

8

At Paragraph 29
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element of the definition may introduce jurisdictional challenges in execution of the Final
Rule.
Having the ability to both withdraw and inject energy to the grid are central to the ESR
definition. To emphasize this, the Final Rule clarifies that even resources capable of
both operations, if constrained by its operational configuration or contractual obligations
to only withdraw or inject energy to the grid, would not meet the elements of the ESR
definition (FERC, 2018)9. Indeed, the Final Rule points out the specific instance of
behind-the-meter storage resources capable of only withdrawing energy that would not
qualify as ESR’s, but rather demand response resources for which distinct participation
models are already available (FERC, 2008b, 2011b).
ESR Qualification
The Final Rule also requires tariffs to include qualification criteria that provide clear
eligibility requirements for wholesale market participation as an ESR. In alignment with
the ESR definition, these qualification criteria need to be based on the physical and
operational attributes of a resource, in addition to assuring resource dispatchability
corresponding to these attributes (FERC, 2018)10. Beyond an expectation that
qualification criteria themselves not introduce barriers to market participation, greater
proscriptive requirements on the criteria were avoided with the intention of providing
RTO/ISO’s with a degree of flexibility to ease incorporation of the ESR participation
model into their varied wholesale market structures (FERC, 2018)11.

9

At Paragraph 32
At Paragraph 61
11 At Paragraph 62
10
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Technical Requirements to Provide Services and ESR Capabilities
The Final Rule repeatedly emphasizes the need for ESR participation models to allow
such resources to offer services that they are technically capable of providing. This
range of service is quite expansive, including services procured through organized
competitive markets (i.e., energy, capacity and ancillary services) and services not
currently procured through such mechanisms (e.g., black start service, primary
frequency response, reactive power, etc.), with all service provision requiring
compensation commensurate with the service provided (FERC, 2018)12. One could
question whether introduction of a new participation model will introduce an
unwarranted preference to procure services from ESR’s. On the contrary, the Final
Rule’s stated goal is to simply remove barriers to ESR participation, thereby enhancing
competition among all resources that are technically capable of providing a given
service (FERC, 2018)13. There are no general requirements to modify technical
requirements that resources need to meet to provide specific services. ESR’s instead
must be capable of meeting all existing technical requirements, presumably applicable
to all other potential service providers, to ensure reliable provision of such services
(FERC, 2018)14.
An allowance provided to ESR’s to meet specific technical requirements for services is
the ability to de-rate its capacity, relative to the rated nameplate capacity, in order to
meet minimum run-time requirements, primarily for providing capacity services (FERC,

12

At Paragraph 70
At Paragraph 52
14 At Paragraph 77
13
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2018)15. As an example, a unit capable of storing 1000 kWh of energy providing power
at its nameplate rating of 500 kW can provide this power for up to 2 hours. De-rating
would allow the unit to offer a lower power output so that it could meet longer run-times
(e.g., 250 kW output for 4 hours) typically needed to meet the technical requirements of
various services. This allowance therefore leaves in place the technical requirement
needed to ensure reliable provision of given service, in this case capacity, while
permitting ESR participation that is reflective of the resource’s operational and physical
characteristics (i.e., the ability to deliver its full energy capacity at lower power).
Relationship Between ESR’s and Other Participation Models
Neither participation as an ESR nor wholesale market participation in general is
required of potentially qualifiable storage resources under any mandates within the Final
Rule; both actions are voluntary (FERC, 2018)16. In an effort to avoid unnecessary
disruptions to the RTO/ISO’s and resource owners, the Final Rule clarifies that any
existing participation models already available to storage resources (e.g., for pumped
hydroelectric storage or demand response) need not be consolidated with the newer
ESR model. Therefore, storage resources are free to continue operating under
participation models to which they were previously qualified for, if so desired. Qualifying
storage resources may also choose to not be a direct party in wholesale market
transactions. The Final Rule clarifies this allowance with at least an implicit
understanding that some resource owners may not wish to bear the burden of meeting

15
16

At Paragraph 93
At Paragraph 55
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the wholesale market participant responsibilities17 called for in FERC’s rules and
regulations.
2.2.2 Roles and Dispatch of ESR’s
Having established the required core elements of what is to be considered an ESR, the
Final Rule proceeds to outline details of the second element of the corresponding
participation model. These details are largely related to roles ESR’s may play in
providing specific services, the associated dispatch process, and ESR compensation for
non-economic dispatch.
ESR Roles in Service Provision
Most elements of the electric system are capable of either primarily injecting or
withdrawing energy from the grid. These system elements would then inhabit the roles
of either supply or demand (i.e., load), respectively, in electric markets. Given the
capabilities of storage resources permitting both electricity withdrawal and injection,
ESR’s have the flexibility to play both supply- and demand-type roles in wholesale
markets. Recognizing this flexibility, the Final Rule provides clear requirements that the
participation models must ensure the ability of ESR’s to be dispatched by RTO/ISO’s as
either a supply or demand in wholesale markets (FERC, 2018)18. As an extension to
this dispatchability requirement, the participation models need to include the ability of

17

As stated in footnote 50 of the Final Rule (FERC, 2018), regulated responsibilities of participating
resources may include filing rates, submitting information related to corporate activities and fulfilling
accounting obligations, as dictated in the FPA.
18 At Paragraph 140
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dispatched ESR’s to set market clearing prices, consistent with existing market price
setting rules, through both wholesale market buyer and seller bids.
ESR Dispatch Process
One challenge faced by an ESR’s dual roles is avoiding conflicting dispatch instructions
with the same market interval, as this may introduce operational uncertainties or
reliability concerns (FERC, 2018)19. It is possible to reduce the likelihood of such
conflicting signals by avoiding requirements for ESR to provide simultaneous supply
and demand bids for a given market interval or through appropriate design of bid
parameters. Flexibility is provided to the RTO/ISO’s to address residual operational
risks resulting from conflicting bid and dispatch signals in a given market interval.
Nevertheless, the RTO/ISO’s are required to demonstrate in their tariff update proposals
how existing or modified market design and rules prevent such conflicts.
Out-of-Merit Order Dispatch Compensation
A second consideration detailed in the Final Rule pertains to make-whole (i.e., uplift)
payments to ESR’s dispatched out of merit order. Such non-economic dispatch can
occur to address system reliability, system congestion or to accommodate resource
operational characteristics (Bresler, 2014), with the extent of such dispatch depending
on specific electric system and market design features (Bresler, 2014; Pavic, Dvorkin, &
Pandžic, 2019). ESR participation models must allow make-whole payments when an
ESR is dispatched to provide supply at a market price below the resource offer price, as
is typically done for other resources subject to out-of-merit order dispatch (FERC,

19
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2018)20. Additionally, since ESR’s can serve as dispatchable demand (i.e., load)
resources, the ESR participation models must allow make-whole payments when ESR’s
are dispatched to withdraw energy at a market price above the resource’s bid price
(FERC, 2018)21. These dual-direction make-whole payments, unique to ESR
participation models, are considered necessary to ensure ESR’s are treated like other
dispatchable resources, while also removing potential economic disincentives when
dispatched to address reliability concerns.
2.2.3 ESR Market Bidding Parameters and State of Charge Management
RTO/ISO’s use a variety of information to calculate economically-optimized dispatch
schedules for system resources. As an example, traditional generators submit bid
curves to communicate the quantities of energy they are willing to provide at a given
price for specific market intervals. The RTO/ISO’s risk developing dispatch schedules
that, while economically optimal, may be infeasible to execute due to a lack of
accounting for physical and operational constraints of the dispatched resources.
Generators thus provide a variety of additional bidding parameters (e.g., ramping rates,
minimum run times, etc.) reflective of their specific operational characteristics that the
RTO/ISO utilize to develop feasible dispatch schedules.
Application of existing bidding parameters used for traditional generation resources, or
for participation models developed around provision of a narrow set of services (e.g.,
frequency regulation, demand response, etc.), would limit ESR market participation to
providing limited services or risk infeasible dispatch instructions. Both outcomes would

20
21

At Paragraph 174
At Paragraph 175
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inhibit an ESR’s wholesale market participation where the resource would have been
technically capable of providing such services without introducing reliability issue to the
electric system.
Identifying this source of participation barriers for ESR’s, the Final Rule includes a third
required element for the ESR participation models: inclusion of market bidding
parameters reflecting the physical and operational characteristics of ESR’s. As outlined
in Table 2-2, thirteen bidding parameters related to ESR charge states and ramping,
operational durations, and service procurement efficiency were defined for inclusion in
the ESR participation models (FERC, 2018)22. ESR’s would be permitted to submit
bidding parameters in both the day-ahead and real-time markets, along with the ability
to update parameter values needed by RTO/ISO’s to find accurate dispatch solutions
(FERC, 2018)23.
The Final Rule does provide a great degree of flexibility to RTO/ISO’s to ensure that the
physical and operational characteristics of ESR’s are accounted for, having recognized
that unique market designs may enable alternate effective ways of executing this
accounting (FERC, 2018)24. RTO/ISO’s are also allowed discretion to determine
whether submission of any information for specific bidding parameters is obligatory.

22

At Paragraphs 178-231
At Paragraph 189
24 At Paragraph 187
23

22 | P a g e

Table 2-2: Overview of Required ESR Bidding Parameters
(FERC, 2018)
Bidding
Parameter
Category

Charge States
and Rates

Physical/Operational Parameter Definition
Characteristic

Parameter Functions and Details

State of Charge

Amount of energy stored in proportion to
the limit on the amount of energy that can
be stored, typically expressed as a
percentage. It represents the forecasted
starting State of Charge for the market
interval being offered into.

•

State of Charge value that should not be
exceeded (i.e., gone above) when an ESR
is receiving electric energy from the grid

•

Maximum State of
Charge
Minimum State of
Charge

State of Charge value that should not be
exceeded (i.e., gone below) when an ESR
is injecting electric energy onto the grid

Maximum Charge Limit

Maximum MW quantity of electric energy
that an ESR can receive from the grid

Maximum Discharge
Limit

Maximum MW quantity of electric energy
that an ESR can inject onto the grid

•
•
•

•
•
•

Reflects actual operating conditions
of resource
Provides greater certainty to
RTO/ISO on ESR capability
Telemetered in real time
ESR owner may elect selfmanagement (default) or RTO/ISO
management
Places limits on extent RTO/ISO
can charge/discharge ESR
Ensures operation within design
limits
Provision of static or dynamic
values should be allowed
Similar to traditional economic
maximum (highest output available
for economic dispatch)

23 | P a g e

Table 2-2: Overview of Required ESR Bidding Parameters (cont’d)
(FERC, 2018)
Bidding
Parameter
Category

Physical/Operational Parameter Definition
Characteristic

Parameter Functions and Details

Minimum Charge Time

•

Shortest duration that an ESR is able to be
dispatched to receive electric energy from
the grid

•

Maximum Charge Time

Maximum duration that an ESR is able to
be dispatched to receive electric energy
from the grid

•

•

Operational
Durations
Minimum Run Time

Minimum amount of time that an ESR is
able to inject electric energy to the grid

•
•
•

Maximum Run Time

Maximum amount of time that an ESR is
able to inject electric energy to the grid

•

Potentially more applicable to
resources with slow transition
speeds
Similar to traditional Minimum Run
Time, but reflects ESR withdrawal
duration
Prevents charging dispatch
exceeding Maximum State of
Charge (self-managed State of
Charge)
Provides info on reliable withdrawal
duration (self-managed State of
Charge)
Prevents ESR wear and tear due to
frequent start/stop
Ensures start-up costs are
recoverable
Similar to traditional Minimum Run
Time
Maximum discharge time due to
physical, operational or contractual
constraints
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Table 2-2: Overview of Required ESR Bidding Parameters (cont’d)
(FERC, 2018)
Bidding
Parameter
Category

Improved
Service
Procurement
Efficiency

Physical/Operational Parameter Definition
Characteristic

Notes

Minimum Discharge
Limit

Minimum MW output level that an ESR can
inject onto the grid

•

Limits may result from physical
constraints/power electronics

Minimum Charge Limit

Minimum MW level that an ESR can
receive from the grid

Discharge Ramp Rate

Speed at which an ESR can move from
zero output to its Maximum Discharge Limit

•

Charge Ramp Rate

Speed at which an ESR can move from
zero output to its Minimum Charge Limit

Reflects possible difference in rates
to achieving Maximum
Discharge/Charge Limits
Similar to traditional Ramp Rate

•
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The parameters were designed for a wide range of storage resource characteristics,
some of which might not be applicable to specific storage technologies and
configurations (FERC, 2018)25, State of Charge oversight (see below) or ESR
commercial obligations (FERC, 2018)26.
State of Charge Management
Requirements related to the management of an ESR’s state of charge and, by
extension, the values of the related bidding parameters, are also included in the Final
Rule. Specifically, ESR owners must be allowed to self-manage the state of charge of
their respective resources (FERC, 2018)27. RTO/ISO’s are still permitted to have
mechanisms to manage ESR state of charge, but election for such management must
remain optional and require ESR owner opt-in (e.g., self-management is the default
operational state).
Self-management is advantageous for a variety of reasons, but it also comes with
increased performance accountability for the ESR owners and operators. Owner,
presumably having best understanding of the long-term operation and instantaneous
state of their storage resource, may be able to better optimize resource operation than
RTO/ISO’s, especially when providing a variety of service types. Self-management may
also reduce wear and tear on the ESR through better attention to critical operational
limits (FERC, 2018)28. For example, violation of ESR Minimum and Maximum States of
Charge levels can lead to significantly shortened resource lifetime or lead to hazardous

25

At Paragraph 188
At Paragraph 207
27 At Paragraph 246
28 At Paragraph 247
26
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operating conditions for some storage technologies. Real time telemetry may mitigate
some of this risk in the case of RTO/ISO state of charge management, but operators
still carry some residual risk of sub-optimal resource operation due to telemetry failures
or inaccuracies.
Some advantages can be had from RTO/ISO management of ESR state of charge.
ESR owners are fully accountable for not meeting performance requirements when selfmanaging, and are subject to performance-based penalties when not meeting dispatch
schedules (FERC, 2018)29; RTO/ISO management of state of charge exempts the ESR
owner from these potential penalties. Additionally, since resource owner have a greater
capability to intentionally manipulate market conditions through physical or economic
withholding when self-managing state of charge, market monitoring scrutiny may be
expected to be commensurately greater (FERC, 2018)30. RTO/ISO management could
relieve some of this monitoring pressure. Lastly, RTO/ISO state of charge management
could actually improve the ability of ESR’s to provide select services (e.g., frequency
regulation) due to unique technical requirements of those services (FERC, 2018)31.
2.2.4 Minimum Size Requirements
As the commercialization of newer storage technologies advances, the US electric
system has seen the scale of proposals for such storage resources approaching that of
traditional generation resources. For example, Pacific Gas & Electric recently received
approval from the CPUC for two battery storage projects, one for 180 MW and a second
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31 At Paragraph 246
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at 300 MW, to replace retiring gas generators (CPUC, 2018). However, as shown in
Figure 2-1, most storage resources operational in the US starting after 2000 have
nameplate capacities ranging from less than 1 MW up to approximately 20 MW (EIA,
2017b), which are significantly smaller than that of other electric system resources.
Most existing participation models include minimum size requirements, but those were
implemented prior to the emergence of smaller scale technologies utilized for storage
resources (FERC, 2018)32. Use of existing minimum size requirements would therefore
prevent most storage resources from participating in wholesale markets. In an effort to
remove the source of barriers to ESR participation, the Final Rule provided a fourth
required element for the participation model, stipulating a minimum resource size for
ESR’s using the associated participation model.
A minimum resource size of 100 kW is mandated for the ESR model, and is to be
utilized for all capacity requirements and minimum energy injection/withdrawal bidding
quantities (FERC, 2018)33. This limit represents a balancing of two considerations.
First, the Commission has acknowledged the challenges faced by RTO/ISO’s with
determining dispatch solutions as the allowed resource size decreases (FERC, 2018)34.
At the same time, all RTO/ISO’s have demonstrated the ability to accommodate
resources small resource capacities; each has at least one existing participation model
allowing resources as small as 100 kW (FERC, 2018)35.
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34 At Paragraph 266
35 At Paragraph 267
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115 of 133 (~86%) of
New Operating
Storage ≤ 20 MW

Figure 2-1: Newly Operational Energy Storage Generators (2000 – 2018)
Note: Each bar represents the nameplate capacity of a single operating generator using storage-based
technology listed in (EIA, 2017b). Generators using storage-based technology include Batteries,
Flywheels, Hydroelectric Pumped Storage, and Solar Thermal with Energy Storage.

2.3

Energy for ESR Charging

Storage resources have multiple options for obtaining energy for charging. Storage
resources coupled with on-site generation (e.g., solar-plus-storage projects) can be
charged directly from generation in excess of on-site demand. Alternatively, charging
can occur with energy purchased from the grid. Stored energy providing end-use
services to the resource owner would be procured via retail transactions, and are clearly
outside the Commission’s scope (See Chapter 3). Energy purchased from the grid for
charging, where the stored energy will later be injected back to the grid for resale, would
occur via a wholesale transaction. The characterization of such purchases as occurring
29 | P a g e

through wholesale markets had been established over 20 years prior to the issue date
of Order No. 841 in the case of pumped air storage facilities (FERC, 1995). The
Commission found that this characterization was now broadly applicable to energy
purchased to charge ESR’s injecting energy back to the grid for later resale (FERC,
2018)36.
The prices of energy purchased for later resale consist of multiple standard
components, including the incremental cost of the energy, transmission constraints
present at the point of purchase and transmission losses. Thus, the wholesale prices
charged to conventional loads can vary significantly depending on the load’s location on
the grid and the transmission constraints experienced at that location (ISO-NE, 2019a).
This composite price is referred to as a wholesale locational marginal price (LMP), and
is the wholesale energy price paid by conventional loads. The wholesale LMP can
reflect either the specific location, or node, at which the location is connected to the grid
(i.e., nodal LMP), or across a zone representing an aggregation of pricing nodes (i.e.,
zonal LMP).
Accordingly, the Final Rule requires that ESR’s be charged the wholesale LMP,
specifically the nodal LMP (FERC, 2018)37, for such whole energy purchases, just as
any other load would be charged when purchasing energy for later resale. While the
energy price requirement is applicable to storage resources using the ESR participation
model, the Final Rule clearly indicates the ability of storage resources to be charged the
wholesale LMP is not derived from the use of any specific participation model;

36
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applicability of wholesale LMP’s arises solely from the wholesale nature of the
transaction (FERC, 2018)38. Therefore, a resource meeting the Final Rule’s definition of
an ESR is entitled to purchase energy for later resale at the wholesale LMP, regardless
of whether it is using the ESR participation model required by The Final Rule, or some
other participation model. Additionally, this requirement to allow purchase of charging
energy at the wholesale LMP applies to ESR’s interconnected at all levels of the electric
system, (i.e., transmission-, distribution and behind-the-meter-connections).
As detailed above, energy used for ESR’s charging can come from a variety of sources
and be applied to different uses (e.g., retail vs. wholesale activities). The Commission
finds it critical that RTO/ISO’s be able to reliably differentiate between and account for
these activities to ensure wholesale energy sales for ESR charging occur at the
wholesale LMP. As such, the Final Rule requires some form of direct metering of
ESR’s, or other comparable means of enabling proper accounting of wholesale energy
purchases of ESR charging, to ensure proper application of wholesale LMP charges
(FERC, 2018)39. It is recognized that this requirement may be difficult to address, and
may require close coordination with distribution utilities and regulatory bodies
possessing jurisdiction over the distribution portions of the electric grid (FERC, 2018)40.
Related to wholesale energy purchases and withdrawals, the Final Rule seeks to further
provide equivalent treatment of ESR’s and more traditional electric system elements.
The issue of transmission charges is specifically addressed for the two scenarios where
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ESR’s purchase energy for later resale. First, ESR wholesale energy purchases
intended for simply charging and later resale are identical in nature to load-related
withdrawals executed by load-serving entities (LSE) (FERC, 2018)41. Given this
identical nature, ESR’s are thus deemed to have an identical liability for related
transmission charges imposed on LSE’s. Second, when dispatched to provide services
requiring energy withdrawal from the grid (e.g. ancillary services), ESR’s would not be
responsible for paying transmission charges; this treatment is consistent with that of
traditional generators providing ancillary services (FERC, 2018)42.
2.4

Key Out-of-Scope Topics

Throughout the process leading up to issuance of the Final Rule, a variety of topics
were within the scope of consideration, but were ultimately identified as being out of
scope of this Final Rule (FERC, 2018)43. These topics arose either through proposals
made by FERC or through stakeholder comments submitted in response to the
associated NOPR and the proposed form of the Final Rule. This list of topics explicitly
deemed out of scope of the Final Rule is quite long, consisting of over 20 various items.
Comprehensive review of each topic may be of limited value when assessing their
general impact on removal of barriers to ESR participation in the US electric system.
However, three topics are worth a brief consideration due to their more obvious impacts
on participation barriers for storage resources. These include: (1) rules for aggregated
demand response participation in wholesale electric markets, (2) expansion of ESR
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At Paragraph 292
At Paragraph 293
43 At Paragraph 324
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participation models to wholesale markets outside of the organized markets managed
by the RTO/ISO’s, and (3) incorporation of ESR’s into transmission planning activities.
As indicated in Section 1.3 (Footnote 5), the 2016 NOPR initially sought comments on
wholesale market participation rules for both electric storage resources and aggregated
distributed energy resources (DER), but further action on aggregated DER was split off
into a separate docket, RM-18-9-000, prior to issuance of the Final Rule (FERC,
2018)44. In the context of the Final Rule, any storage resource rated at less than 100
kW would only be able to participate in wholesale electric markets through some form of
aggregation mechanism allowing multiple storage resources to bid to inject or withdraw
electric energy as part of wholesale transactions.
Consideration of aggregated storage resources participation may not be a critical area
needing immediate attention from FERC at the current time. As shown in Table 2-3,
small-scale storage projects reported to the U.S. Energy Information Administration (i.e.,
< 1 MW nameplate capacity) accounted for no more than 0.4% of all operational storage
power capacity in the US in 2016 and 2017, the only years in which such data is
available. Storage capacity not eligible to participate in wholesale electric markets
under the ESR participation models represents a subset of this capacity and would
make up an even smaller percentage of existing US storage capacity.
Yet future reductions in costs of storage technology amenable to systems with
capacities lower than 100 kW or creation of effective subsidies for such resources could

44

At Paragraph 5
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Table 2-3: 2018 Electric Energy Served by RTO/ISO’s
Large-Scale Storage Resources (≥ 1 MW)

2016
(EIA, 2016c)

2017
(EIA, 2017b)

Nameplate Capacity (MW)
(EIA, 2016c)

Nameplate Capacity (MW)
(EIA, 2017b)

Battery

545.2

707.8

Flywheels

44.0

42.0

21572.7

21643.3

Natural Gas with
Compressed Air
Storage

110.0

110.0

Solar Thermal with
Energy Storage

405.0

405.0

Large-Scale Battery
Total

22676.9

22908.1

Year
Technology

Pumped Hydroelectric

Small-Scale Storage Resources (< 1 MW)

Year

2016
(EIA, 2016a)

2017
(EIA, 2017a)

Non-Net Metered
Nameplate
Capacity (MW)

Net Metered
Nameplate
Capacity (MW)

Non-Net Metered
Nameplate
Capacity (MW)

Net Metered
Nameplate
Capacity (MW)

Residential

0.1

4.5

3.9

13.3

Commercial

32.7

7.6

42.9

15.4

Industrial

8.7

11.7

12.3

12.3

Transportation

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

Direct Connection

1.2

N/A

1.4

N/A

Sector

Small-Scale Battery
Total a

66.5

101.5

% Total Storage
Nameplate Capacity b

0.3

0.4

a. Sum of Non-Net Metered and Net Metered Nameplate Capacity
b. Small-scale storage resources as a percentage of total storage (large- and small-scale) resources
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change the urgency of this need. To date, FERC organized a technical conference in
April, 2018 to generally discuss potential effects of DER’s on bulk power systems,
including considerations for future actions to address aggregated DER wholesale
market participation. As of March, 2019, no subsequent Commission actions or
communications have been posted to docket RM-18-9-000 related to aggregated
storage resource participation.
A second deferred item, expansion of the Final Rule’s scope to storage resources not
residing within RTO/ISO territories, was not further considered because the original
NOPR was specifically limited to reforms of the structured wholesale markets
coordinated by the RTO/ISO’s that fall within FERC’s jurisdiction45. While retention of
these scope boundaries in the Final Rule are understandable from a procedural view,
from a practical perspective, removal of participation barriers for storage resources
should be within FERC’s legislated authority and responsibility regardless of which
national wholesale market a resource has access to. The Commission’s rationale that
existing market rules presenting barriers to storage resource participation lead to unjust
and unreasonable, and therefore unlawful rates would seem to be equally valid
regardless of whether one considers wholesale electric markets run by the RTO/ISO’s
within FERC’s jurisdiction or other, more local entities.

45

ERCOT, a Regional Transmission Organization, is wholly contained within Texas, and is not
synchronized with or interconnected with electric systems in other states. All wholesale transactions
occurring in ERCOT’s wholesale markets are intrastate sales, and are outside the authorized jurisdiction
of FERC.
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Table 2-4: 2018 Electric Energy Served by RTO/ISO’s
Transmission
System Operator/
Region

2018 Annual
Energy Served/
Generation
(TWh)

% of Total
2018 Energy
Generation

Reference

2017 LargeScale Battery
Power
Capacity
(MW)d

% of Total
2017 LargeScale Battery
Power
Capacity

PJM Interconnection

807

21

(PJM, 2019)

278

39

Midwest ISO (MISO)

684

18

(MISO, 2019)

21

3

Southwest Power Pool
(SPP)

276

7

(ERCOT, 2019a)

Not Reported

N/A

California ISO (CAISO)

239

6

(PowerSouth Energy Cooperative,
2019)

130

18

New York ISO (NYISO)

156a

4

(NYISO, 2018a)

Not Reported

N/A

ISO New England
(ISO-NE)

142

4

(ISO-NE, 2019b)

23

3

US

3802

100

(EIA, 2019a)

708

100

Combined RTO/ISO
Regionsb

2304

61

N/A

452

64

Other Regions

1498c

39

N/A

256

36

a.
b.
c.
d.

2018 baseline demand forecast
ERCOT generation and large-scale battery power capacity included: ERCOT does not fall under FERC’s jurisdiction
Value calculated as difference between total US and Combined RTO/ISO Region generation
(EIA, 2018) Figure 2
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The load not served by the six RTO/ISO’s within FERC’s jurisdiction represents a minor,
but not insignificant portion of annual electricity sales to all end-use sectors (residential,
commercial, industrial, transportation). As shown in Table 2-4, 39% of the 2018 annual
total US sales occurred outside of these six RTO/ISO-operated markets. The largescale battery storage power capacity installed outside of territories served by RTO/ISO’s
made up approximately 36% of all such capacity in 2017 (EIA, 2018). Even if future
growth trends in both annual energy sales and installed storage capacity are not
comparable in regions served by RTO/ISO’s and those served by other entities, there
will likely continue to be significant portions of the US wholesale electric markets without
clearly applicable rules governing storage resource participation. FERC will therefore
continue to have opportunities requiring its intervention to ensure storage resources can
contribute to the achievement of increased competition and ultimately just and
reasonable electricity rates in all regions of the country.
Finally, tasking RTO’s and ISO’s with including storage resources in transmission
planning was not addressed in the NOPR, and as such, is not within scope of the
proscriptions laid out in the Final Rule. The RTO/ISO’s have ultimate responsibility for
short-term reliability, long-term planning and expansion of the transmission system
(FERC, 1996, 2000). With a relatively low penetration of storage resources at the
various interconnection levels in the current electric system, risks originating from
increased utilization of transmission services by storage resources is likely to be
minimal at the present time. Inclusion of ESR’s in transmission planning considerations
may not currently be critical to maintaining transmission system reliability. Neither is it
clear that such consideration may present barriers to storage resource participation.
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Inclusion of storage resources in transmission planning can reasonably be expected to
become more critical as larger, non-PHES storage resources become approved (see
above, Section 2.2.4), presumably interconnected at the transmission-level. More
challenging may be the need to closely coordinate transmission planning with
distribution- and BTM-level needs if increasing numbers of storage resources located at
those interconnection levels seek to participate in wholesale market transactions. Such
infrastructure planning will require close interactions between, at a minimum, federal
and state-level regulatory agencies with jurisdiction over the planning of the relevant
portions of the electric system.
2.5

ESR Value Creation and Participation Model-Driven Storage Capacity
Deployment

The Final Rule does not include any targeted level of ESR deployment. It simply seeks
to increase competition in wholesale electricity markets and, ultimately, lower electricity
rates. Increased participation of ESR’s within the scope considered in the Final Rule, is
viewed simply as a means to achieving these lower rates. Such an arguably narrow
statement of focus should not be surprising; as discussed in Chapter 3, ensuring just
and reasonable rates (i.e., lower rates achieved through increased competition) is the
foundation upon which the Commission’s authorized jurisdiction rests to require creation
of the new participation models.
Regardless of the Order’s stated focus, as new opportunities for ESR’s to provide gridrelated services are realized through the new participation models, there should be
greater prospects for ESR to generate increasing value for a broad range of
stakeholders. Depending on the nature and size of this created value, increased ESR
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participation will lead to commensurate increases in available storage capacity, all other
things considered equal (i.e., resource costs). Assessing the value creation provide by
use of the ESR participation models can offer insight into how the US energy storage
capacity may change upon implementation of the models and identification of additional
barriers to the development of greater storage resource capacity.
Electric storage resources are not unique in their ability to provide multiple types of
services to the grid; generation resources have long provided energy, capacity and
ancillary services. However, as the rate of renewable energy resources penetration has
increased, so too has the appreciation of the uniquely broad range of services that
electricity storage technologies can provide. In a meta-analysis of previous studies,
Rocky Mountain Institute (RMI) provided a framework of 13 services, categorizing
according to the stakeholders reaping the greatest benefits from a given service type
(Fitzgerald, Mandel, Morris, & Touatl, 2015). These categories included RTO/ISO
services, utility services and customer services. Several studies performed by the
Brattle Group over the past few years identified a similar, but not identical, range of
benefits that energy storage was capable of providing (Chang et al., 2015). In this case,
the authors utilized a categorization based on parties through which the benefits would
be measured, as summarized in Table 2-5.
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Table 2-5: Electric Storage Resource Value Categorization
(Chang et al., 2015)
Value Category

Category Description

Merchant Value

Net profits that a private investor could monetize by
participating in wholesale markets

System-Wide/
Societal Benefits

Overall benefits of storage to the electric system as a whole,
regardless of whether those benefits and costs accrue to the
asset owner, retail customers, market participants or other
entities

Customer Benefits

Benefits that accrue directly to electricity users

Figure 2-2 provides a graphical comparison of these two models, delineating the value
categorizations, associated value types common between the two categorization
schemes, and value types unique to each categorization. Some differentiation between
any energy storage valuation frameworks can be expected. As the electric grid
continues to evolve, innovative uses of electric storage resources may be realized as
new grid needs also materialize. In a related fashion, newer valuation studies may
ignore previously assessed value types that have been demonstrated to be relatively
insignificant. Also, some valuation studies may elect to emphasize or exclude specific
electric storage benefits based on the intended study goals or the methodological
difficulties introduced by specific value types.
Both categorization schemes can be used to assess the impact of the ESR participation
models on the service value provided by storage resources and how that value is
received by different grid participants and stakeholders. However, the value
categorization utilized by the Brattle group provides a more intuitive structure for
assessing the impact of new resource participation models to the electric system. First,
the Brattle model’s focus on merchant value (i.e., net profits obtainable by resource
40 | P a g e

Figure 2-2: Two Models for Energy Storage Value Categorization
(Chang et al., 2015; Fitzgerald et al., 2015)
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owners) places a clear emphasis on the stakeholders directly responsible for developing
and owning new electric storage resources, as well as the economic signals needed to
achieve market equilibrium-levels of storage resources. RMI’s alternate focus on
RTO’s/ISO’s provides a more indirect assessment, given the absence of storage
resource ownership by these organizations. Second, the Brattle group’s broader
definition of system-wide benefits is agnostic with respect to which stakeholder group
should ultimately benefit from storage-derived values that are external to those enjoyed
by resource owners; RMI’s categorization implies exclusive enjoyment of these benefits
by utilities. The treatment of customer benefits is comparable between the two
categorization models. Elements of the ESR participation models have not yet been
generally implemented, with the exception being for those RTO’s/ISO’s proposing to
leverage existing wholesale market structures to meet the requirements in the Final
Rule, as discussed further in Chapter 4. Thus, there have not been detailed quantitative
studies undertaken to predict the impact of the ESR various participation models on
either the realizable benefits at the merchant, system or customer levels, or the levels of
storage capacity.
Nonetheless, studies have been performed that can illustrate useful insights about
storage resource benefits relevant to the new ESR participation models. One study by
the Brattle group investigated the value of distributed storage resources in the
transmission region operated by the Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT)
(Chang et al., 2015). The study attempted to predict the economic viability of varying
storage deployment levels capable of meeting the peak load increases forecasted for
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2020. Scenarios ranging from 1000 – 8000 MW of deployed storage capacity were
investigated.
The merchant value was observed to increase along with storage deployment level
(Figure 2-3). Despite these increasing total net profits for the storage resource owners,
decreasing profit margins were forecast for higher storage deployment levels due
primarily to saturation of the ancillary services market (Figure 2-4) by the added storage
resources. This source of declining merchant value with increased storage deployment
may not be unique to the ERCOT region, but could also be experienced in regions
where the sizes of ancillary services markets are significantly smaller than the
respective energy markets46.
In ERCOT region, merchant values alone were to forecasted to be sufficient to justify
the costs of only the lowest levels of storage deployment considered. Several cost
estimates were utilized, reflecting: (1) expected and high battery cost with different fixed
operations and maintenance costs, and (2) different discount rates (i.e., after-tax
weighted-average cost of capital (ATWACC) to simulate financing available to larger
utility owners (lower ATWACC) and smaller merchant owners (higher ATWACC). As
shown in Figure 2-3, with smaller merchants as the primary source of storage
deployment, only 1000 MW of new storage capacity would be justified based on
merchants recouping storage value from energy and ancillary service market net profits
only, assuming they were able to achieve the expected battery and installation costs of

As an example, ISO-NE’s 2017 ancillary services costs ($128.3 million) were less than 3% of that from
the energy markets ($4.5 billion) (ISO-NE, 2018a).
46
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Figure 2-3: 2020 Forecasted Merchant Value and Storage Costs
(From Figure 17, (Chang et al., 2015))

Figure 2-4: 2020 Annual Net Revenues for Storage
(From Figure 6, (Chang et al., 2015))
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$350/kWh. Even with their lower financing costs, larger utility owners would still need to
achieve the lower battery costs of $350/kWh in order for the somewhat higher
deployment of 3000 MW to be financially viable.
Greater levels of storage deployment may become economically feasible if there is
mechanism to provide at least some of the other value provided by the other two
categories (system-wide and customer benefits). The Brattle group study of ERCOT
region predicts that as much as 8000 MW of storage would be economically feasible
based on currently expected 2020 battery costs (Figure 2-5). This assessment only
considered large utilities with lower ATWACC in estimating prices, so inclusion of finite
levels of smaller merchant ownership could be expected to again result in somewhat
lower storage deployment. Regardless, one can still notice a pattern of declining
marginal system-wide benefits with increasing storage deployment, similar to that
observed when assessing merchant value. While there are no apparent decreases in
any of the system-wide value types with increasing storage deployment, the growth of
some components (e.g., avoided capacity investments) clearly do not keep up with the
increased deployment costs.
With its focus on providing greater opportunities for storage resource participation, the
ESR participation models required by the Final Rule will have a direct impact on
merchant value. However, the participation model requirements lack any of the
mechanisms needed to ensure that storage resource owners capture some of the
system-wide benefits that could encourage the needed levels of investment for higher
storage deployment levels. System-wide benefits are, by definition, more disperse and
involve a greater number of stakeholders relative to merchant value. Therefore, it may
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Figure 2-5: 2020 Annual Net Revenues for Storage
(From Figure 18, (Chang et al., 2015))
be a significantly greater challenge for FERC to expand upon its efforts, as started in
this Final Rule, to further broaden energy storage participation in wholesale markets.
The system-wide benefits may also involve planning for electric system components
that are outside the scope of FERC’s authority (e.g., generation and distribution
planning). Such efforts will require close collaboration between the Commission and
state-level regulatory entities.
2.6

Conclusions

The Final Rule issued in Order No. 841 by FERC outlines four principal requirements for
a participation model for electric storage resources to be implemented by the various
RTO’s and ISO’s. Resources that are qualified to meet the requirements of the
associated new resource, the Electric Storage Resource, are eligible to provide all
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energy-related services in wholesale markets that they are technically capable of
providing. The ESR participation models will be required to allow qualifying storage
resources to be dispatched as a buyer and seller of energy market services. Resources
utilizing the ESR participation will thus be eligible to set market clearing prices,
regardless of whether submitted wholesale bids are for energy withdrawal, injection or
both, in the case where the ESR is the marginal resource for a given market interval.
To facilitate the ability to provide supply offers and demand bids in a fashion that does
not impede wholesale market participation, the Final Rule provides a range of thirteen
required bid parameters as part of the ESR participation model while providing
RTO/ISO’s with great flexibility on incorporation of these parameters into existing
bidding systems. Additionally, the Final Rule proscribes that any storage resource be
charged at the wholesale LMP when purchasing energy for storage that will later be
reinjected to the grid for resale.
The Final Rule does indeed provide a framework to address issues related to storage
resource participation in wholesale markets. However, as with any other regulatory
effort, Order No. 841 can’t reasonably be expected to address all outstanding issues on
a topic as complex as energy storage, nor can it anticipate all future challenges
associated with storage. Several issues were identified as out of scope of the Final
Rule, but may become more critical as an increasing range of storage resources seek to
participate in wholesale electric markets in the future: aggregated demand response
participation, storage resource participation outside RTO/ISO territory, and careful
coordination of transmission planning.
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Finally, the current focus on using participation models to increase wholesale market
competition is a mechanism by which FERC has significant experience using.
However, this approach primarily addresses realization of merchant value, which may
be insufficient to achieve optimal levels of storage resource deployment even as
storage costs continue to decrease. The Commission will need to address how systemwide benefits are produced and consider mechanisms to leverage these benefits to
provide more comprehensive market signals that energy storage owners need to aid in
deploying economically-optimal storage capacity levels.
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Chapter 3 Legal Foundations and Jurisdictional Perspectives on ESR
Regulation
3.1

Introduction

Just as with any other market structure, the US electricity market is not a static
construct; even since restructuring away from the then-dominant vertically integrated
utility models began in 1980’s (Lazar, 2016), it has continued to evolve. Indeed, upon
upcoming implementation of the tariff revisions defining the electric storage resource
(ESR) participation models, Order No. 841 (FERC, 2018) itself will be one of the latest
regulatory-driven changes occurring within US electricity markets.
The market structure, and the regulatory regime defining aspects of that structure,
provides the mechanism (e.g., pricing signals) by which ESR service values are
identified and the extent to which compensation is provided. In working towards
creation of Order No. 841, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) has
sought to create sustainable regulatory and market mechanisms needed to increase
ESR participation beyond current levels.
Uncertainty around how an ESR can participate in US electricity markets may serve as
an impediment to the realization of economically-optimal development, implementation
and utilization of these resources. Since development and financing of ESR’s involve
making long-term decisions, rapid changes in this nascent regulatory regime could
result in many ESR’s becoming stranded assets. Additionally, regulatory uncertainty
could conceivably lead to the long-term suppression of appetite for further investment in
innovation of a resource that could greatly facilitate transition to a lower-carbonemission national energy system.
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An assessment of the ability of the requirements embodied in Order No. 841 to
withstand judicial challenge can help inform the likelihood of the durability of the Orderdriven participation models and the sustainability of the non-discriminatory environment
for ESR’s potential roles in the national electricity system. This assessment will include:
(1) a brief overview of FERC’s traditional jurisdiction over interstate wholesale electricity
sales, (2) a summary of FERC’s authorization and jurisdictional claims relevant to the
Order, (3) discussion of vulnerabilities to judicial review by FERC’s recent execution of
that jurisdiction in Order No. 841 and (4) challenges arising from that jurisdictional
execution.
3.2

FERC Jurisdiction over Interstate Wholesale Electricity Sales

An understanding of the derivation of FERC’s currently exercised jurisdiction in
electricity markets, along with the dual regulatory system established with the States,
will illuminate subsequent discussions on the resilience that Order No. 841 may expect
as the ISO’s and RTO’s begin implementation of their ESR participation models. Key to
this understanding includes detailing Congress’ driver for implementing regulation of
electricity markets, the primary objectives of this regulation, and delineation of federal
and state jurisdiction over wholesale electricity markets.
The need for Congressional action to regulate wholesale electricity sales became
evident through the US Supreme Court’s decision in Public Utilities Commission of
Rhode Island v. Attleboro Steam & Elec. Co. (Public Util. Comm. V. Attleboro Co.,
1927). The case resulted from the Public Utilities Commission of Rhode Island
implementing price schedules for electricity purchases made by an out-of-state
company (Attleboro Steam & Electric Company) from an in-state generator
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(Narragansett Electric Lighting Company). The decision identified these sales as
“national in character” (i.e., not local matters subject to jurisdiction of a single State).
Accordingly, the Court indicated that only Congress has the power to enact regulations
impacting such interstate commerce for electric power.
Congress ultimately did respond, enacting Part II (Regulation of Electric Utility
Companies Engaged in Interstate Commerce) of the Federal Power Act (FPA) in 1935
(Federal Power Act, 1935). This addition to the FPA has since served as the
overarching US statute governing regulation of electricity sales, transmission,
distribution and generation. The integral statutory role assigned to FERC (and its
predecessor group, the Federal Power Commission) is ensuring that all rates and
charges for electricity sales within its jurisdiction, as well as rates and regulations
impacting those sales, are “just, reasonable and not unduly discriminatory or
preferential” (FERC, 2011a).
The FPA created a concurrent regulatory scheme where, not only are the federal
jurisdictional bounds outlined, but explicit carve-outs for interdependent State
jurisdiction not subject to preemption are provided (Dennis, Kelly, Nordhaus, & Smith,
2016; Lindh, 2013; Nordhaus, 2015). The specific aspects of federal jurisdiction
captured in the FPA include electricity transmission and wholesale electricity sales
when either occur as part of interstate commerce. The delineated State jurisdiction
encompasses four areas: (1) electricity sales other than those within federal jurisdiction
(i.e., sale at wholesale in interstate commerce), (2) generation or local distribution
facilities, (3) facilities used for intra-state commerce, and (4) transmission facilities for
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electricity consumed wholly by the transmission facility owner (Federal Power Act,
1935).
The execution of this collaborative structure was greatly influenced by the US Supreme
Court findings in Federal Power Commission v. Southern California Edison Co. (Federal
Power Commission v. Southern Cal. Edison, 1964). In this case, the Court assessed
whether the jurisdiction previously exercised by the CPUC over the rates charged to the
City of Colton (CA) for energy generated at the Hoover Dam was preempted by the
Dormant Commerce Clause of the US Constitution. The Court found that these
interstate wholesale electricity sales were not exempt from federal jurisdiction,
preempting the CPUC’s jurisdiction. The decision went further by rejecting the need for
case-by-case assessment of the federal jurisdictional scope under the FPA and that
jurisdiction’s impact on state regulation. This perspective was derived from the
Congress’ establishment of a “bright line easily ascertained” between state and federal
jurisdiction as they relate to interstate wholesale electricity sales.
Taken together with the dual regulatory structure in Part II of the FPA and the Federal
Power Commission v. Southern California Edison Co. decision, an operational
understanding of state and federal jurisdictional authorization took shape for electricity
sales. In the execution of this bright line, federal jurisdiction would preempt State
statues and regulation in the case of interstate wholesale sales; the only exceptions
would involve those clearly derived from the State carve-outs explicitly captured in the
FPA or other applicable federal statutes (Lindh, 2013).
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3.3

FERC’s Authorization and Jurisdictional Claims in Order No. 841

As with other federal regulatory agencies, FERC exercises the authority conferred upon
it by Congress, with the FPA serving as a key document defining the limits of that
authority (California Indep. Sys. Operator Corp. v. FERC, 2004). To ensure its actions
are lawful and within its statutorily-defined jurisdiction, FERC’s regulations and actions
are subject to judicial review (Administrative Procedure Act, 1946). Thus, a lack of care
by FERC in documenting the statutory authority under which it is executing new
regulations, such as with the present case in Order No. 841, could lead to the
realization of significant regulatory risk and poor electricity market function.
Within the Order, there are two key matters discussed related to FERC’s authority and
its associated jurisdiction (FERC, 2018). First, FERC outlined a general consideration
of whether it is authorized to enact regulations impacting resources that can be qualified
as ESR’s. Generally, the Commission viewed current market rules and available
participation models as effectively introducing barriers to competition. As a result, the
status quo for ESR participation in wholesale electricity markets was viewed as unjust
and unreasonable; Order No. 841 is thus intended to serve as a needed mechanism to
mitigate what FERC considers an unlawful state of a type defined by the FPA.
Central to FERC’s assessment is the realization that technology used in the electricity
system has not remained static, and as in the case of electricity storage, continued
evolution can be expected. Regardless of specific technologies utilized, new resources
are likely to have technical capabilities different from those envisioned when existing
wholesale market rules were enacted by ISO’s and RTO’s (Gonzále, 2016). So, while
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an ESR may not be fully excluded from participating in wholesale markets, it may also
not be able to provide all services that it is technically capable of due to limitations
imposed by rules likely designed for traditional electrical system resources or specific
technologies. These barriers to full ESR participation, even if not intended when
applicable market rules were designed, are now viewed as a source of restriction on
market competition and a commensurate failure to ensure just and reasonable
wholesale rates (FERC, 2018).
A second key jurisdictional matter in the Order arose as part of the Commission’s
determination on the definition of an ESR. The original definition proposed in the Notice
of Proposed Rulemaking (NOPR) characterized an ESR as “a resource capable of
receiving electric energy from the grid and storing it for later injection of electric energy
back to the grid regardless of where the resource is located on the electrical system”
(FERC, 2016). The Final Rule did not ultimately include any qualification of the ESR
location, but provided clarification that system location does not establish applicability of
the ESR definition. Specifically, resources meeting the definition would not be limited to
those interconnected to the interstate transmission system (i.e., the location of activities
typically in scope of FERC jurisdiction); distribution-level and behind-the-meter (BTM)
resources could also qualify as ESR’s and come under federal jurisdiction (FERC,
2018) when seeking to participate in wholesale market activities.
This broad resource definition was indeed viewed positively by a number of
commenters on the NOPR. Perceived benefits of this approach include providing
market access to energy exported by BTM storage resources (Comments of the Energy
Storage Association (Docket Nos. RM16-23-000; AD16-20-000; Order No. 841), 2017)
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and removal of barriers preventing BTM resources from providing both retail and
wholesale services (Comments of Advanced Microgrid Solutions, Inc. (Docket Nos.
RM16-23-000; AD16-20-000; Order No. 841), 2017).
3.4

FERC Jurisdictional Execution and Order 841

3.4.1 Vulnerability to Judicial Review
If ESR’s had capabilities that limited the resources to direct participation in only
wholesale sales, or if they were only interconnected at the transmission level, FERC’s
claimed authority outlined for these resources would not be controversial. For example,
PHES has provided energy storage services in the US since the 1930’s (Yang &
Jackson, 2011), and, as recently as the March, 2018, provided ~94% of all electricity
storage capacity in the US (2018). When much of the existing PHES capacity was built
in the US in the 1960’s and 1970’s, the value of this storage resource was largely based
on economic comparisons to fossil fuel plants providing only utility-level energy and
capacity (Denholm, Ela, Kirby, & Milligan, 2010). The grid interface (i.e., transmission
level) and electricity market participation for these storage resources were thus
comparable to that of conventional generators. Therefore, the traditional “bright line”
between federal and state jurisdictional separation was generally suitable to provide
clear, stable regulatory regimes under which long-term economic decisions on resource
development and utilization could be made (Nordhaus, 2015).
The rapid change represented by the wider range of available storage technologies,
recognition of and need for the wider range of services available from ESR’s, and their
attainment of critical levels of commercial maturity, prompted FERC to address barrier
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to ESR participation in wholesale markets (FERC, 2016). However, along with this
diversity in services that ESR can provide, the grid and its applicable regulatory
framework must now also contend with diversity in resource interconnection and market
participation (Jacob, 2017). As new technologies and practices arise that can have
direct impact on both the wholesale and retail levels, the bright line jurisdictional test
may fall short; an engrained recognition of the potential interrelationship between
federal and state regulatory actions will be needed.
Key among the challenges presented by the availability of these diverse services are
questions regarding whether the FERC has inappropriately pre-empted state authority
by establish regulations on distribution- and BTM-level electric system components. A
number of commenters to the 2016 NOPR took issue with potential jurisdictional
implications of the proposed resource definition. A consistent theme among the
commenters was the extent to which the Order would impact established state and
local-level jurisdiction. Possible impacted areas include provision of retail and
distribution-level services (APPA/NRECA, 2017) and distribution system design
(DTE Energy, 2017; MISO Transmission Owners, 2017)
Order No 841 is not the first instance where FERC has addressed wholesale market
participation by sub-transmission-level resources. Recently, FERC issued Order Nos.
719 and 745, outlining demand response resource participation in wholesale markets
(FERC, 2008b, 2011b). Of particular relevance to this discussion, various commenters
to those orders questioned FERC’s authority to set compensation for demand response
resources in organized wholesale markets, declaring “that the issue of demand
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response compensation is fundamentally intertwined with retail rates, ratepayer issues
and state jurisdictional concerns” (FERC, 2011b)47.
Order No. 745 provided an explicit rejection of these challenges to the Commission’s
claimed authority. The Commission had previously determined that demand response
bids into wholesale markets have a direct impact on wholesale rates (FERC, 2008a)48.
FERC thus claimed its authorization, citing its mandate provided by the FPA to ensure
rates and charges for transmission or interstate wholesale sales are just and
reasonable, especially when the respective activities are found to direct affect wholesale
rates (FERC, 2011b)49
The Electric Power Supply Association, a trade association representing various large
energy producers and generators, was among several petitioners that requested a
judicial review of FERC’s claimed authority regarding direct response resources. Upon
the ruling by the US District Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia to vacate the
entirety of Order No. 745 (Electric Power Supply Association v. Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission, 2015), FERC appealed the decision to the US Supreme Court.
In the resulting ruling (Federal Energy Regulatory Commission v. Electric Power Supply
Association, 2016), the US Supreme Court affirmed that FERC had operated within its
authorized jurisdiction; Order No. 745 was indeed related to practices directly affecting
wholesale rates. Additionally, FERC could exercise this jurisdiction without impinging
State authorities outlined in the FPA since no attempts were made to regulate retail
sales involving demand response.

47

At Paragraph 103
At Paragraph 47
49 At Paragraph 112
48
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Order No. 841 leverages the precedent set with demand response in Order Nos. 719
and 745 as well as the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission v. Electric Power
Supply Association decision to reiterate the Commission’s claim of exclusive jurisdiction
over wholesale market participation, even for resources connected at the subtransmission level (FERC, 2018)50. However, FERC’s efforts on ESR’s excluded one
aspect that was part of the Orders on demand response; no allowance is made for
relevant State-level regulatory bodies to prohibit ESR owners from making wholesale
markets bids. While generally discussed in the context of aggregated storage resource
participation, commenters noted the value afforded by certain rule features (e.g.,
inclusion of a State-level opt out for allowing distribution-level of BTM resources from
participating in wholesale markets) to the maintenance of State-level jurisdiction
(DTE Energy, 2017; MISO Transmission Owners, 2017).
The absence of such opt-outs in the Order may reinforce concerns regarding overexpansive jurisdictional claims by FERC at the expense of those reserved for States by
the FPA. An initial avenue for challenges could originate from the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission v. Electric Power Supply Association decision the Order No.
841 leverages as precedent. Specifically, the decision cites Order No. 745’s allowance
for “any State regulator to prohibit its consumers from making demand response bids in
the wholesale market” as a demonstration of “FERC’s notable solicitude toward the
States” (Federal Energy Regulatory Commission v. Electric Power Supply Association
et al., 2016). It is this recognition by FERC, derived from the interrelated nature of
wholesale and retail markets especially relevant for sub-transmission-level resources,
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that served as the “finishing blow” to EPSA’s claims of federal intrusion on State-level
jurisdiction.
The Final Rule in Order No. 841 does recognize the variety of roles that states play in
the implementation of electric storage resources, including design, operation and
reliability of the distribution system, in addition to regulation of retail services (FERC,
2018)51. It also states the intention to not affect the responsibilities of distribution
utilities, especially with respect to electric storage resource. The need for such
allowances may become more pressing as FERC works further on the aggregated ESR
docket.
3.4.2 Challenges Arising from FERC’s Jurisdictional Execution
The nature of the electric grid and its associated components and practices will continue
to evolve, presenting new jurisdictional challenges for FERC, state-level regulators, grid
service suppliers and customers. Electric storage and demand response are just two
examples where the classical “bright line” that provided a clear interface between
federal and state regulatory jurisdiction is no longer so obvious now that specific grid
components can play significant roles in both wholesale and retail markets. In both
cases, the Commission staked out a seemingly broader implementation of its authorized
jurisdiction at the expense the states’ jurisdiction by focusing on the direct impact to
interstate wholesale sales by ESR and demand response participation. The validity of
the Commission’s approach to preempting State authority over all interstate wholesale
sales was upheld for demand response with the Federal Energy Regulatory
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Commission v. Electric Power Supply Association ruling. To date, no such cases have
been brought involving Order No. 841 and energy storage; it may be too early to tell if or
how Order No. 841 will be challenged for possible unlawful preemption of State powers
authorized under Part II of the FPA.
This increasing deference to federal jurisdiction at the expense of the states’ authority,
even if it survives future judicial challenge, does not come without consequences. For
example, in its Orders on electric storage and demand response wholesale market
participation, the Commission has continued to recognize earlier participation by such
resources in specific states as a precursor to taking broader, national-level actions
(FERC, 2018)52, (FERC, 2008b)53. The states can thus effectively provide
environments capable of delivering earlier introduction of technological and market
innovations. It is unlikely that FERC could ever develop the detailed understanding of
local-level grid aspects and stakeholder impacts, as well as gather the necessary
resources, to match what the sum of the nation’s individual states could apply to such
challenges. The end result of this jurisdictional approach could inhibit the development
and maturing of technological innovations that FERC is seeking to attain just and
reasonable electricity rates through increased wholesale market competition.
It should be noted that while FERC has taken a more exclusive interpretation of its
jurisdiction when it perceives an action directly impacting interstate wholesale electricity
prices, the Commission still acknowledges the “vital role of the states with respect to the
development and operation of electric storage resources.” (FERC, 2018)54. This
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At Paragraph 11
At Paragraph 18
54 At Paragraph 36
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perspective, voiced in establishing the requirements for the ESR participation model,
mirrors the fundamentally intertwined nature of demand response jurisdictional issues
previously expressed by the Commission (FERC, 2011b)55. Such recognition may be a
sign of FERC’s understanding the value of continued cooperative actions with its Statelevel counterparts. In the absence of focused actions undertaken to exploit benefits
available from deeper, cooperative relationships with State regulatory bodies, it isn’t
clear how successful or timely FERC will be in addressing this challenge56.
Additionally, development of market design and practices applied on the national, or
even the regional level managed by the individual RTO/ISO’s, without being informed of
relevant needs at the state and local level risks can introduce unintended reliability
concerns to the electric system. For example, RTO/ISO’s have a mandated role in
long-term transmission planning, whereas distribution planning is left to state and local
regulatory bodies. As described by De Martini et. al., (distribution and transmission
system planning are foreseen to require an integrated approach for electric systems
seeking high levels of distributed energy resources, including energy storage, while still
maintaining acceptable reliability levels (De Martini & Kristov, 2015). Thus, the
transmission and distribution planning required to meet many of the state-level
renewable energy policy goals, in addition to the concomitant increases in wholesale
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FERC Order 719, footnote 79 mentions efforts between National Association of Regulatory
Commissioners and the Commission to “outline options to coordinate retail and wholesale regulatory
policies in order to stimulate demand response by reducing or eliminating jurisdictional barriers” (FERC,
2008b). Further research into the scope and impact of these efforts may better illuminate the value of
FERC’s efforts to date to proactively address multi-jurisdictional issues faced by distributed energy
resources (including ESR’s and demand response).
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electric market competition sought by FERC, will likely require more than just an everexpanding deference to federal jurisdiction.
Finally, any evolving regulatory regime will likely cause some level of uncertainty in
stakeholders wishing to initiate or further expand provision of novel services, including
those provided by ESR’s. In the face of changing regulatory regimes, organizations
must not simply contend with the ability of their current business model to create and
capture value in earlier market conditions. A business model’s ability “to remain
feasible and viable in a changing business environment” (Haaker, Bouwman, Janssen,
& De Reuver, 2017) becomes just as critical as understanding how the model
fundamentally allows it to create and capture value (Bouwman H., 2008).
The electricity sector, like other infrastructure sectors, are capital intensive, utilize longlived physical assets and are subject to significant regulation (Markard, 2011). These
features make the sector vulnerable to developing substantial levels of stranded assets
if the underlying business models are not sufficiently robust. The importance that
regulations play in determining electricity sector business model viability has begun
receiving greater attention, typically as part of studies investigating sector disruptions
such as renewable energy transitions and introduction of market competition (Leisen,
Steffen, & Weber, 2019). Indeed, the nature of regulations and associated institutions
are viewed as playing a key role in both renewable energy technology innovation
(Markard, 2011) and deciding the degree of future renewable infrastructure
centralization (Schmid, Knopf, & Pechan, 2016).
A policy process effect, originating from uncertainty in initial business model viability and
long-term resilience in the face of uncertainty in the speed and probability of regulatory
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regime change, has been identified as a source of investments gaps (Garnier &
Madlener, 2016). For ESR’s, one such policy process impact can result from judicial
review and subsequent rollback of novel aspects of the regulatory structure and
participation model implementation created by Order No. 841. The risk of such an
occurrence has the potential to remove mid- or long-term market participation by a
resource class that is still in an early innovative phase. Mitigation of such risks could
involve a number of undesirable outcomes: (1) chilling further investments in innovation
that could reduce the cost and increase the capability of future types of ESR’s, (2)
lowering levels of investment to implement mature ESR technologies for market
participation (avoiding the risk of owning newly-stranded assets), and (3) need for
additional incentives to maintain desired investment levels.
3.5

Conclusions

The unidirectional design of the early US electric grid provided for a reasonably clear
delineation between electricity producers, suppliers and customers. This demarcation
allowed for a clear differentiation between parties to wholesale (inter- and intra-state)
and retail electricity sales, and the effectuation of the dual federal and state jurisdictional
structure, as authorized by Part II of the FPA, along this “bright line”.
ESR’s, and other distributed energy resources, now present a landscape where market
participants can simultaneously provide wholesale and retail services. At the same
time, this technology is enabling generation assets to be located at all interconnectionlevels, including behind the meters of traditional retail customers. Time and technology
have thus served to blur the line (Nordhaus, 2015) that had provided a relatively clear
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understanding by electric system stakeholders of a key aspect of the federal and state
regulatory structure.
Acknowledging this evolution, FERC outlined two elements in Order No. 841 to justify its
continued ability to regulate interstate wholesale sales as embodied in issuance of the
Final Rule. First, the FPA clearly provided authorization to the Commission to remedy
the any unjust and unreasonable interstate wholesale electricity rates, including those
resulting from current market rules and participation models not reflecting an ESR’s full
capabilities. Second, the FPA provided no qualification to the Commission’s authority
regarding the nature of the market participants or the interconnection of relevant
electrical system components, as long as they were directly impacting interstate
wholesale electricity sales.
While aligning with one perspective of FERC’s long-established jurisdictional
authorization, the justifications leveraged in Order No. 841 do not come without
vulnerabilities to judicial challenge. Concerns that Order No. 841 may lead to eventual
unlawful pre-emption of state authority by FERC in establishing regulations on
distribution- and BTM-level electric system components were voiced in stakeholder
comments on the Final Rule. A similar version of the jurisdictional construct outlined in
Order No. 841 was upheld for demand response resources with the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission v. Electric Power Supply Association ruling. However, a lack of
deference to State regulatory authority to allowing prohibition of ESR owners from
making wholesale market bids, unlike that provided for demand response participation
models, may reinforce concerns of regulatory overreach by the Commission.
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FERC’s current jurisdictional approach to distributed energy resources presents
opportunities to drive unintended adverse effects on the US electric system. First,
excessive minimization of the roles of state regulatory agencies can stifle the innovative
incubation environments provided at the state level that can efficiently drive the
technological innovations sought by FERC to enable increased interstate wholesale
electric market competition. Second, wholesale market design developed in a vacuum
on the federal/regional level may introduce unintended reliability risks to the electric
system arising from market and grid performance issues arising at the state and local
levels. Finally, any rollback in the interstate wholesale electric market processes due to
regulatory overreach by FERC will create uncertainty in the existing regulatory regime
experienced by ESR’s. This uncertainty will drive unwanted opportunities for
investment gaps in the development and commissioning of ESR’s and other distributed
energy resources. Continued, active engagement between FERC and its State-level
counterparts will become increasingly important to avoid these undesirable outcomes,
especially as the types of mature distributed energy resources increases and their use
in wholesale electric markets accelerates.
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Chapter 4 Assessment of Proposed RTO/ISO Market and Tariff
Revisions
4.1

Order No. 841 Compliance Plan Filings

In alignment with the action timelines required by Order No. 841, the six ISO/RTO’s filed
their proposed Tariff revisions on December 3, 2018. In addition to the red-lined Tariff
versions, the filings also required a presentation of the justification as to how the Tariff
updates would comply with the Order No. 841 Final Rule requirements for the ESR
participation model and the prices paid for ESR charging used for subsequent
wholesale transaction. The relevant docket under which the respective Tariff proposals
were filed are presented in Table 4-1.
Table 4-1: FERC Dockets: ISO/RTO Order No. 841 Compliance Plan Filings
ISO/RTO

FERC Docket57

California ISO (CAISO)

ER19-468

ISO New England (ISO-NE)

ER19-470

Midwest ISO (MISO)

ER19-465

New York ISO (NYISO)

ER19-467

PJM Interconnection
Southwest Power Pool (SPP)

ER19-469 (Markets and Operations Proposal)
ER19-462 (Accounting Proposal)
ER19-460

The Energy Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT) is not subject to the requirements to
submit Tariff updates in compliance with Order No. 841 because the operation of

57

FERC dockets can be accessed at https://elibrary.ferc.gov/idmws/docket_search.asp
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ERCOT’s wholly intrastate transmission system is outside the jurisdiction established for
FERC under the Federal Power Act. Despite the absence of such an obligation,
ERCOT is maintaining awareness of the activities that other ISO/RTO’s have
undertaken in order to “help inform its own future processes related to the integration of
electric storage resources” (ERCOT, 2019b).
Line-by-line analysis of the red-lined versions of the proposed tariff revisions from the
six in-scope RTO/ISO/s would be an exhaustive method to outlining the approaches
proposed for establishing the energy storage-specific participation models. Yet this
approach risks missing the forest through the trees. Therefore, this chapter will attempt
to tabulate and discuss key themes and approaches taken by the RTO/ISO’s within their
proposed participation models. Additionally, a brief overview of the compliance
deficiency letters sent by FERC on April 1, 2019 to each of the RTO/ISO’s will be
provided as an assessment of the Commission’s outstanding compliance concerns with
the proposed compliance plans.
4.2

Proposed Participation Models

This section will provide a tabulation of the participation models proposed by the
RTO/ISO’s, with a brief discussion on the different paths taken to develop these models.
This overview is followed by a presentation of select elements of the participation
models and an explanation of the use of the resource types in relation to participation
models. Finally, specific details of the role of the proposed participation models in the
RTO/ISO unit commitment and dispatch process are discussed.
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Overview of Proposed Participation Models
In line with the flexibility provided by Order No. 841 to comply with the requirements to
establish ESR participation models, the compliance plans from the RTO/ISO’s each
have unique features designed to best fit with existing market structure and supporting
infrastructure elements (e.g., market optimization software). As shown in Table 4-2,
each RTO/ISO has provided one or more participation model under which storage
resources can bid for or offer to provide service through wholesale markets.
The effort a given RTO/ISO had invested, prior to Order No. 841 becoming effective,
towards developing market structures enable storage resource participation, had a large
impact on the proposed ESR participation models. For example, CAISO had worked for
several years to develop and implement the Non-Generator Resource (NGR)
participation model (CAISO, 2018). CAISO’s participation plan therefore has attempted
to justify compliance of the NGR model with the Order No. 841 requirements.
Conversely, SPP had not previously needed to support methods for storage resource
participation beyond that needed for existing PHES resources (FERC, 2019c). As such,
SPP added new tariff elements that were often taken directly from the Order itself.
Other RTO/ISO’s had previously allowed participation by newer storage technologies,
but didn’t provide for the full participation called for in the Final Rule. In such cases, the
compliance plans adapted existing tariff elements to fill the gaps necessary to meet the
Final Rule requirements. PJM modified an existing Energy Storage Resource model to
permit for energy withdrawals (FERC, 2019b). In a similar fashion, ISO-NE made
significant progress in vetting a platform enabling wholesale market participation by
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Table 4-2: Proposed Participation Model and Resource Types
ISO/RTO

Participation Model

Model Details

CAISO

Non-Generator Resource
(NGR)

Primary participation model for common storage
technologies

Pumped-Storage Hydro Units

Demand Response Resource

ISO-NE

Energy Storage Facility –
Continuous

Energy Storage Facility –
Binary

•

Operates as either Generation or Load

•

Dispatchable to any operating level, seamlessly over
entire capacity range

•

Constrained by a MWh limit to generate or consume
Energy

•

Can elect to use Regulation Energy Management for
more efficient capacity bids into Day-Ahead (DA)
regulation markets

•

Used for hydroelectric dams capable of producing
electricity and pumping water for later energy
production

Available Resource Types

•

Generating Unit (injection)

•

Participating Load (withdrawal)

•

Operates as either Generation or Load

•

Provides dispatchable demand (withdrawal)

•

•

Generally used by Behind-the-Meter (BTM) retail
customers and aggregated resources

Proxy Demand Resources (traditional
demand response)

•

Reliability Demand Resources
(dispatched near or at system
emergency)

•

Generator Asset (GA) (injection)

•

Dispatchable Asset Related Demand
(DARD) (withdrawal)

•

Alternative Technology Regulation
Resource (ATRR) (Regulation)

•

GA (injection and regulation)

•

DARD (withdrawal) available starting in
2024

•

Transitions seamlessly (< 10 minutes) between
charging and discharging

•

Dispatchable to any operating level over entire
capacity range

Extends PHES storage treatment to other storage
technologies
•

Can’t instantly (<10 minutes) switch from charging to
discharging
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Table 4-2: Proposed Participation Model and Resource Types (cont’d)
ISO/RTO

Participation Model

Model Details

MISO

Electric Storage Resource

•
•

Includes all technologies and/or storage mediums
Must be physically located within MISO Balancing
Authority Area

NYISO

Energy Storage Resource

•

Dispatchable to any operating level, seamlessly over
entire capacity range

•

Supplier (provides capacity, demand
reductions, energy or ancillary services)

•

Continuous bid curves across full operating range

•

Withdrawal-Eligible Generator

•

Dispatch-only resources (DA and Real Time (RT)
Energy Markets only)

•

Does not include BTM Net Generation Resources

•

Energy injection and withdrawal must occur at the
same location

•

Capable of sustained injection at 0.1 MW for at least
1 hour

Generator

•

Injection-only resource

Energy Limited Resources

•

Not capable of continuous operation on a daily basis

•

•

Must be capable of operating for at least 4 consecutive
hours each day

Supplier (provides capacity, demand
reductions, energy or ancillary services)

•

Withdrawal-Eligible Generator

•

Accommodates “infeasible” operating range around
0 MW

•

Regulation Service provision only

•

Not capable of sustaining continuous operation at
maximum Energy withdrawal or injection limits for at
least 1 hour

•

Capable of being dispatched to curtail Load

•

Demand Side Resource

Limited Energy Storage
Resource

Demand Response Programs

Available Resource Types
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Table 4-2: Proposed Participation Model and Resource Types (cont’d)
ISO/RTO

Participation Model

•

Model Details

PJM

Energy Storage Resource

•

Expands role to also include Market Buyer
(withdrawal)

•

Emphasizes real time dispatchability and price setting;
no optimization in DA Market

•

Participates in Energy, Capacity and/or Ancillary
Services Markets

•

Participation model selection to occur on annual basis

•

Expands role to also include Market Buyer (withdrawal)

•

Emphasizes real time dispatchability and price setting;
no optimization in DA Market

•

Participates in the Reliability Pricing Model or
otherwise treated as capacity

•

Participation model selection to occur on annual basis

•

Developed for large pumped hydro storage sources
(min. 500 MW) that can be turn on/off quickly

•

Utilizes an optimizer to establish DA Energy Market
schedules

•

Not scalable to small, fast-responding systems

•

Introduction of dispatchable Energy withdrawal to
SPP’s Markets

•

Excludes resources physically incapable of or
contractually barred from injecting Energy to the
Transmission System

•

Dispatchable to any operating level, seamlessly over
entire capacity range

•

Resources with discontinuous Energy Offer Curves
across 0 MW need to choose to offer either supply or
demand

Capacity Storage Resource

Pumped Hydro Storage
Resource

SPP

Energy Storage Resource

Available Resource Types

•

Market Storage Resource
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battery storage technologies. A plan based on these earlier efforts was filed with the
Commission on October 10, 2018 (ISO-NE, 2018b), but was later modified to address
known compliance gaps with the Final Rule Requirements (ISO-NE, 2018c).
Participation Models Elements and Resource Types
Some RTO/ISO’s offer multiple participation models available to storage resources, with
the resource owner provided the discretion to select a given model as required per the
Final Rule. PJM and CAISO provide models specifically geared toward PHES
resources, while ISO-NE offers a Binary Storage Resource model originally designed
for PHES resources that was recently broadened to allow use by any resource that can’t
instantaneously switch (i.e., in less than 10 minutes) between charging and discharging.
PJM provides separate models for storage resource seeking to provide either general
services (e.g., energy, capacity and ancillary services) or exclusively capacity services;
model election can be updated on an annual basis by the resource owner. NYISO
instead has proposed participation models based on the ability to provide daily
continuous operation.
While compliance with the Final Rule requirements is ensures the availability of at least
one compliant participation model, there is no requirement that all participation models
available to storage resources are compliant. Thus, there are still participation models
available to storage resources, in cases where RTO/ISO’s offer multiple options, that
will not comply with the Final Rule requirements. An obvious example are the demand
response models offered by NYISO and CAISO, which can be utilized by storage
resources, but only allow resources to be dispatched for energy withdrawal.

72 | P a g e

Finally, some RTO/ISO additionally use the concept of a resource type, or alternatively,
a registration type, along with participation models. As indicated in Chapter 2, FERC
refers to participation models as the tariff provisions applicable to specific resource
types. Resource types, however, is not a term explicitly defined in the compliance plans
or tariffs, but is used here to refer to the classification of an asset under which it will be
registered to participate in a given market or provide specific services. Table 4-2
indicates the various resource types available for specific participation models provided
for storage resources by the various RTO/ISO’s. Resource type registration can be
applied to specific participation models, as shown in Figure 4-1 for the SPP Market
Storage Resource, which only applies to the Energy Storage Resource participation
model.

Figure 4-1: SPP Energy Storage Participation Model and Resource Type
More complex relationships can exist between participation models and resources, such
as that shown in Figure 4-2 for the ISO-NE Energy Storage Facility-related resource
types. Assets registered as a Continuous Storage Facility (CSF) must be registered for
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Figure 4-2: ISO-NE Energy Storage Participation Models and Resource Types58
three additional resource types: (1) a Dispatchable Asset Related Demand (DARD) to
provide energy withdrawals, (2) and Generator Asset (GA) to provide energy injections,
and an Alternate Technology Regulation Resource (ATRR) in order to provide
regulation services. However, the DARD, GA and ATRR resource types are not limited
to the registration of Continuous Storage Facilities; Figure 4-2 also displays the

58

Portions of Figure 4-2 were adapted from (Peet, Asselin, & Pant, 2019)
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resource types for which a Binary Storage Facility would need to be registered (i.e.,
DARD and GA).
Unit Commitment and Dispatch – Storage Resource Limitations
The proposed participation models take a variety of approaches to unit commitment and
dispatch. These approaches provide insights into the capabilities of a given RTO/ISO’s
market processes and infrastructure, and how the current storage technology operation
capabilities are perceived. In the case the RTO/ISO day-ahead and real-time markets,
the following generic definitions can be utilized for unit commitment and dispatch:
Unit Commitment: The process of creating a schedule of resources to be in a specific
operating state (e.g., “On” or “Off”) for specific market intervals, utilizing participantprovided bid/offer data and resource operating constraints
Dispatch: Use of resources assigned via a previous unit commitment process, or those
currently available to be utilized, to provide specific grid services in a specific market
interval
A number of RTO/ISO’s place restrictions on the unit commitment process for resources
using ESR participation models. One common restriction is the required use of a
continuous bid curve covering the quantities of energy to be injected or withdrawn for a
given price. Continuous bid curves across the whole injection/withdrawal range require
the absence of operational discontinuities around 0 MW than can result from finite
minimum charging/discharging limits and times, or non-instantaneous ramp rates.
Therefore, a requirement for continuous bid curves implies that storage resources must
serve as dispatch-only resources or, from an equivalent operational perspective, have
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no technical constraints preventing dispatch anywhere along the provided bid curve
range for any market interval.
NYISO’s Energy Storage Resource and ISO-NE’s CSF both explicitly require
continuous bid curves, but their respective participation models approach the lack of
commitment availability somewhat differently. NYISO’s Energy Storage Resource is
explicitly defined as a dispatch-only resource (NYISO, 2018b). NYISO has indicated
that the need for requiring continuous bid curves originated specifically from limitations
with the existing unit commitment software; timely solutions for the DA and RT-Market
unit commitments became infeasible with inclusion of as little as eight such noncontinuous resources. NYISO does acknowledge that such limitations are currently
acceptable for current storage technologies (e.g., battery storage) that would potentially
be used within its territory, but may not provide for the technologically-agnostic
participation required by the Final Rule. As discussed below in Section 4-4, this gap
has been noted by the Commission; it is not yet known how NYISO will ultimately
address this gap in the near term.
In comparison, ISO-NE does include CSF’s in its unit commitment process. However,
various bid parameters essential for the commitment process must be set to 0 (e.g.,
Economic Minimum Limit, Minimum Run Time, Start-up Fees, etc.), indicating that such
resources can be dispatched during any interval in which it has submitted a bid curve. It
should be noted that ISO-NE does provide some allowance for storage resources with
operational limit preventing instantaneous switching between charging and discharging
through the ability to utilize the alternate Binary Storage Facility participation model.
The services that a Binary Storage Facility is permitted to provide is commensurately
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limited, though; the longer switch time precludes provision of regulatory reserves and
the mechanism to register such facilities to provide energy withdrawals is not planned to
be available until 2024.
MISO and PJM take a similar approach to unit and commitment and dispatch as ISONE, leveraging details of submitted bid curves. These RTO/ISO’s employ an additional
designation, a resource’s commitment status, to inform the commitment process of how
to schedule the respective storage resources. Both regions utilize a range of
commitment status specifications (e.g., Continuous, Charge, Discharge, etc.) providing
general information on how the RTO/ISO can commit the associated storage resource.
Electric Storage Resources in MISO markets and Energy Storage Resources in PJM
markets do have the option to offer both energy injection and withdrawal in a given
interval when designating a Continuous commitment status (FERC, 2019b; MISO,
2018). Such storage resources must provide a continuous bid curve over its entire
submitted operating range, or equivalently, provide no start-up or ramp rate limitations.
As discussed above, requirements for such continuous bid curves are comparable to a
“dispatch-only” operation state, even when nominally included the storage resource in
the unit commitment process. Storage resource with relevant operating limitations can
still submit bid curves for a given interval, but instead must submit offers for either
energy injection or withdrawal in a single market interval, and designating a commitment
status of either “Charge” or “Discharge”59.

59

MISO has additional Commitment Status designations including those related to charging and
discharging under emergency conditions. However, the analysis focuses primarily on normal grid
operating conditions.
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One interesting element of the MISO and PJM commitment process involves some of
the time-related bidding parameters (e.g., Minimum/Maximum Run Time, etc.) that are
critical operational limitations of conventional resources bidding into the commitment
process. Both MISO and PJM allow storage resources with a Continuous commitment
mode to submit values for such parameters, but parameter submission is optional;
submitted values are either not used in the unit commitment process (MISO) or storage
resources are expected to manage their effective commitment status through other
means (PJM). While MISO and PJM include justifications in their respective compliance
plans as to why these approaches do comply with the requirements of the Order,
especially regarding optional submission of specific bidding parameters, FERC has not
initially accepted such proposals with submission of further explanation (see Section 4-4
below).
SPP’s approach to unit commitment and dispatch is a simpler version of that used by
MISO and PJM; a Market Storage Resources (MSR) can only provide energy injection
and withdrawal bids if the associated bid reflects an ability to be continually
dispatchable across its entire operation range, including 0 MW, for a given market
interval. Otherwise, an MSR would need to choose to provide offers for either energy
injection of withdrawal for specific market intervals.
CAISO’s unit commitment and dispatch process for NGR’s appears to provide the
greatest amount of flexibility for a variety of storage operational characteristics. A single
bid curve covering a resource’s operational range must be submitted. While the
compliance filing does not contain any requirements about allowances for
discontinuities in the bid curve, it clearly states that some unit-commitment-related
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bidding parameters (see below) can be submitted for a given resource, typically as
master file parameters, with the parameter values being respected during as part of the
unit commitment process and dispatch in the Day-Ahead and Real Time markets.
Allowance for and respect of non-zero values for Minimum Load or non-instantaneous
Ramp Rates are thus a mechanism for allowing non-continuous storage resources (i.e.,
dispatch-only assets incapable of instantaneous transition from energy injection to
withdrawal across its entire operational range) to participate in the unit commitment
process and dispatch utilizing the NGR participation model.
4.3

Overview of Proposed Bid Parameters

While details of the participation models and associated resource types are important
elements describing how storage resources will interact with the respective RTO/ISO
wholesale markets, the significance of the bidding parameters adopted for the
participation models can’t be understated. Bidding parameters provide clear,
quantitative boundaries to storage resource operational capabilities and operating limits.
These values are utilized by the RTO/ISO’s to ensure that feasible dispatch schedules
are calculated in both day-ahead and real-time markets and for provision of a variety of
ancillary services.
The following section provides a tabulation of the bidding parameters proposed by the
RTO/ISO’s in their compliance plans, including their relation to a corresponding Final
Rule bidding parameter, and where needed for clarity, RTO-specific definition elements
and parameter utilization details. Table 4-3 provides a guide to the subsequent tables
of proposed bidding parameters, which are delineated by the same parameter
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categorization used in Chapter 2. RTO/ISO’s were allowed to propose bidding
parameters beyond those required in the Final Rule, as long their use does not
introduce barriers to storage resource providing services for which they are physically
and operational capable of. These additional parameters are included in Table 4-7.
Table 4-3: Overview of Tables Summarizing RTO/ISO-Specific Bidding Parameter
Proposals
Bid Parameter Proposal
Summary

Bidding Parameter
Category

Order No. 841 Bidding
Parameter Nomenclature

Table 4-4

Charge States and Rates

•
•
•
•
•

State of Charge
Maximum State of Charge
Minimum State of Charge
Maximum Charge Limit
Maximum Discharge Limit

Table 4-5

Operational Durations

•
•
•
•

Minimum Charge Time
Maximum Charge Time
Minimum Run Time
Maximum Run Time

Table 4-6

Improved Service
Procurement Efficiency

•
•
•
•

Minimum Discharge Limit
Minimum Charge Limit
Discharge Ramp Rate
Charge Ramp Rate

Table 4-7

Additional Parameters

Various

The bidding parameters, as indicated in the tables below, can generally be submitted in
two ways: (1) bid elements, or (2) master file parameters. Parameter values submitted
as bid elements are specific to a given market interval and can be expected to change
between market intervals. In contrast, master file parameters can represent a relatively
static operational limit, and RTO/ISO’s may impose limits on the update frequency (e.g.,
on an annual basis).
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Many of the proposed bidding parameters from each of the six RTO/ISO’s are either
identical to those indicated in the Final Rule, or differ only in the naming of the
parameter. However, the approaches proposed by CAISO, PJM, and, to a more limited
extent, NYISO to the use of a large portion of the bidding parameters stands out.
CAISO proposed that the need to submit values for a range of bidding parameters
would be left to the discretion of the storage resource owner (CAISO, 2018). These
parameters include to the Minimum/Maximum State of Charge, Minimum
Charge/Discharge Limits (i.e., CAISO’s proposed Minimum Load parameter) and Ramp
Rates. Conversely, the Minimum/Maximum Charge Times and Minimum/Maximum Run
Times would not be accepted. Limits related to the optional parameters, if submitted,
would be respected during the dispatch schedule optimization runs, whereas the limits
represented by the unaccepted parameters would need to be managed indirectly via
other parameter values and bid submissions elements (e.g., State of Charge Limits,
Minimum/Maximum Energy Limits and the submitted bid curves).
In a similar fashion CAISO does not require submission of Minimum/Maximum State of
Charge, Minimum/Maximum Charge Times and Minimum/Maximum Run Times.
However, these parameter values would not be utilized in any fashion during the
dispatch schedule optimization runs. Management of such physical and operational
limits are instead explicitly left to the storage resource owner via the indirect controls
provided by self-management of the resource’s State of Charge.
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Table 4-4: Bid Parameters: Charge States and Rates
ISO/RTO-Specific Proposed Parameter Name and Description

ISO/RTO
CAISO

State of Charge
State of Charge
If State of Charge is
managed by CAISO,
value is provided through
bidding and master file
parameters
If State of Charge is selfmanaged, value is
provided through bidding
only
NGR’s allowed to include
in bids; if not included,
CAISO utilizes previous
state of charge

Maximum State of
Charge

Minimum State of
Charge

Maximum State of
Charge

Minimum State of
Charge

Not required to be
submitted if NGR selfmanages state of charge
and charge/ discharge
limits

Not required to be
submitted if NGR selfmanages state of charge
and charge/ discharge
limits

If submitted, market
optimization process
respects limits

If submitted, market
optimization process
respects limits

Filed as a master file
parameter

Filed as a master file
parameter

Maximum Charge
Limit
Maximum Charge Limit
Not required to be
submitted if NGR selfmanages state of charge
and charge/ discharge
limits

Maximum
Discharge Limit
Maximum Discharge
Limit
Not explicitly mentioned,
but presumably managed
in identical fashion as
Maximum Charge Limit

If submitted, market
optimization process
respects limits
Filed as a master file
parameter

If providing ancillary
services, must provide
telemetered value every
four seconds

ISO-NE

Available Energy
MWh’s of stored energy available for economic dispatch
Corresponds to State of Charge minus Minimum State of Charge
Value to be telemetered for both Continuous and Binary Storage Facilities
Available Storage

Maximum Consumption
Limit

Economic Maximum
Limit

Provided by all DARD’s as
part of Demand Bids in
DA and RT Energy
Markets

Provided by all GA’s as
part of Supply Offers in
DA and RT Energy
Markets

MWh’s of unused storage available for economic dispatch of consumption
Corresponds to State of Charge minus Maximum State of Charge
Value to be telemetered for both Continuous and Binary Storage Facilities
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Table 4-4: Bid Parameters: Charge States and Rates (cont’d)
ISO/RTO-Specific Proposed Parameter Name and Description

ISO/RTO

State of Charge
State of Charge

NYISO

Minimum State of
Charge

Maximum Charge
Limit

Maximum
Discharge Limit

Maximum Energy
Storage Level

Minimum Energy
Storage Level

Hourly Economic
Maximum Charge Limit

Market dispatch will
enforce during normal
system conditions

Market dispatch will
enforce during normal
system conditions

Market dispatch will
enforce during normal
system conditions

Emergency Maximum
Energy Storage Level

Emergency Minimum
Energy Storage Level

Hourly Emergency
Maximum Charge Limit

Market dispatch will
enforce during Emergency
system conditions

Market dispatch will
enforce during Emergency
system conditions

Market dispatch will
enforce during Emergency
system conditions

Beginning Energy Level

Upper Storage Limit

Lower Storage Limit

Lower Operating Limit

Upper Operating Limit

Provided for both DA and
RT markets

Provided for both DA and
RT markets

Provided for both DA and
RT markets

Minimum MW level an
ESR is willing to operate

Maximum MW level an
ESR is willing to operate

Represents Energy Level
at the beginning of a
market interval

Newly implemented for
ESR’s

Newly implemented for
ESR’s

Reflects both charging
(negative value) and
discharging (positive
value) limits

Reflects both charging
(negative value) and
discharging (positive
value) limits

Can be set lower than 0
MW if bidding to withdraw
Energy

Can be set lower than 0
MW if bidding to withdraw
Energy

Provided for both DA and
RT markets

Must submit
corresponding Normal
and Emergency Upper
Operating Limits (no
greater than Upper
Operating Limit)

Market dispatch will
monitor during normal and
Emergency system
conditions

MISO

Maximum State of
Charge

Parameter must be
managed by ESR’s (not
MISO)

Hourly Economic
Maximum Discharge
Limit
Market dispatch will
enforce during normal
system conditions
Hourly Emergency
Maximum Discharge
Limit
Market dispatch will
enforce during Emergency
system conditions

Provided for both DA and
RT markets
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Table 4-4: Bid Parameters: Charge States and Rates (cont’d)
ISO/RTO-Specific Proposed Parameter Name and Description

ISO/RTO

State of Charge
State of Charge
Required to be
telemetered in real time
for all ESR’s

PJM

Data will not be used to
optimize ESR use across
energy market intervals

State of Charge
Used for RT Balancing
Market (RTBM)

Maximum State of
Charge

Minimum State of
Charge

Maximum State of
Charge

Minimum State of
Charge

Not required to be
submitted

Not required to be
submitted

Parameters will not be
used to make commitment
decisions when using the
ESR Participation model

Parameters will not be
used to make commitment
decisions when using the
ESR Participation model

Maximum State of
Charge

Minimum State of
Charge

Maximum Charge
Limit
Maximum Charge Limit
Used for offering in the
Day-ahead Energy Market
and RT Energy market
(via RT parameter
updates)
Necessary to ensure ESR
dispatch within
operational range

Maximum Charge Limit
For normal operating
conditions

Maximum
Discharge Limit
Maximum Discharge
Limit
Used for offering in the
Day-ahead Energy Market
and RT Energy market
(via RT parameter
updates)
Necessary to ensure ESR
dispatch within
operational range
Maximum Discharge
Limit
For Emergency Condition

Instantaneous values
obtained from telemetered
data – thus, not really a
submitted parameter

SPP

State of Charge
Forecasted

Maximum Emergency
Charge Limit

Maximum Emergency
Discharge Limit

Used for DA Market and
DA Reliability Unit
Commitment (RUC)

For normal operating
conditions

For Emergency Condition

Project value for
beginning of each market
interval
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Table 4-5: Bid Parameters: Operational Durations
ISO/RTO-Specific Proposed Parameter Name and Description

ISO/RTO

Minimum Charge Time

Maximum Charge Time

Minimum Run Time

Maximum Run Time

N/A

CAISO

Managed through the optional state of charge parameters, minimum and maximum continuous energy limits and submitted bid curve

ISO-NE

Minimum Run Time

Available Energy

Minimum Run Time

Available Energy

Must be included in offer/bid data
for GA’s and DARD’s,
respectively, in DA and RT
Energy Markets

MWh’s of stored energy available
for economic dispatch

Must be included in offer/bid data
for GA’s and DARD’s,
respectively, in DA and RT
Energy Markets

MWh’s of stored energy available
for economic dispatch

Binary Storage Facilities value
must be no more than 1 hour

Value to be telemetered for both
Continuous and Binary Storage
Facilities

Required value of 0 for CSF
(always committed)

MISO

Corresponds to State of Charge
minus Minimum State of Charge

Binary Storage Facilities value
must be no more than 1 hour
Required value of 0 for CSF
(always committed)

Corresponds to State of Charge
minus Minimum State of Charge
Value to be telemetered for both
Continuous and Binary Storage
Facilities

Available Storage

Available Storage

MWh’s of unused storage
available for economic dispatch of
consumption
Corresponds to State of Charge
minus Maximum State of Charge

MWh’s of unused storage
available for economic dispatch of
consumption
Corresponds to State of Charge
minus Maximum State of Charge

Value to be telemetered for both
Continuous and Binary Storage
Facilities

Value to be telemetered for both
Continuous and Binary Storage
Facilities

Minimum Charge Time

Maximum Charge Time

Minimum Discharge Time

Maximum Discharge Time

Newly defined parameter

Newly defined parameter

Parameters will be accepted, but
must be managed by ESR
through other parameters (limits
to commitment algorithm and
State of Charge management by
ESR’s)

Parameters will be accepted, but
must be managed by ESR
through other parameters (limits
to commitment algorithm and
State of Charge management by
ESR’s)

Minimum Run Time already
defined, but unique parameter
provided for ESR’s

Maximum Run Time already
defined, but unique parameter
provided for ESR’s

Parameters will be accepted, but
must be managed by ESR
through other parameters (limits
to commitment algorithm and
State of Charge management by
ESR’s)

Parameters will be accepted, but
must be managed by ESR
through other parameters (limits
to commitment algorithm and
State of Charge management by
ESR’s)
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Table 4-5: Bid Parameters: Operational Durations (cont’d)
ISO/RTO-Specific Proposed Parameter Name and Description

ISO/RTO

Minimum Charge Time

Maximum Charge Time

Minimum Run Time

Maximum Run Time

N/A

NYISO

PJM

SPP

Not required: ESR’s considered dispatch-only resources
Minimum Charge Time

Maximum Charge Time

Minimum Run Time

Maximum Run Time

Not required to be submitted

Not required to be submitted

Not required to be submitted

Not required to be submitted

Parameters will not be used to
make commitment decisions
when using the ESR Participation
model

Parameters will not be used to
make commitment decisions
when using the ESR Participation
model

Parameters will not be used to
make commitment decisions
when using the ESR Participation
model

Parameters will not be used to
make commitment decisions
when using the ESR Participation
model

Minimum Charge Time

Maximum Charge Time

Minimum Discharge Time

Maximum Discharge Time

New parameter reflecting bidirectional nature of MSR’s

New parameter reflecting bidirectional nature of MSR’s

New parameter reflecting bidirectional nature of MSR’s

New parameter reflecting bidirectional nature of MSR’s
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Table 4-6: Bid Parameters: Improved Service Procurement Efficiency
ISO/RTO-Specific Proposed Parameter Name and Description

ISO/RTO
CAISO

Minimum Discharge
Limit

Minimum Charge Limit

MISO

Charge Ramp Rate

Minimum Load

Ramp Rate

Not required to be submitted

Not required to be submitted

Minimum sustained operating level at which it can operate at a
continuous sustained level

Can be filed as a bid component or master file parameter
Specific ramp rates can be provided: Operational (for supply),
Regulation, and Operating Reserve (for Spin and Non-Spin)
NGR’s can submit two segments for their ramp rates for discharging
(above 0) and charging (below 0)

Filed as a master file parameter
NGR can submit values for both charging and discharging

ISO-NE

Discharge Ramp Rate

Economic Minimum Limit

Minimum Consumption Limit

Manual Response Rate

Manual Response Rate

Provided by all DARD’s as part of
Demand Bids in DA and RT
Energy Markets

Provided by all GA’s as part of
Supply Offers in DA and RT
Energy Markets

Rate at which the GA is capable
of changing

Rate at which the DARD is
capable of changing

Required value of 0 MW for CSF
(fully dispatchable)

Required value of 0 MW for CSF
(fully dispatchable)

Must be included in offer/bid data
for GA’s and DARD’s,
respectively, in DA and RT
Energy Markets

Must be included in offer/bid data
for GA’s and DARD’s,
respectively, in DA and RT
Energy Markets

Hourly Economic Minimum
Charge Limit

Hourly Economic Minimum
Discharge Limit

Hourly Discharge Ramp Rate

Hourly Charge Ramp Rate

Market dispatch will enforce
during normal system conditions

Market dispatch will enforce
during normal system conditions

Hourly Emergency Minimum
Charge Limit

Hourly Emergency Minimum
Discharge Limit

Rate for moving from zero output
to Hourly Economic Maximum
Discharge Limit and/or from the
Hourly Economic Maximum
Discharge Limit to zero output

Rate for moving from zero output
to Hourly Economic Maximum
Charge Limit and/or from the
Hourly Economic Maximum
Charge Limit to zero output

Market dispatch will enforce
during Emergency system
conditions

Market dispatch will enforce
during Emergency system
conditions

Used in Day-Ahead Energy and
Operating Reserve Market, and
all Reliability Assessment
Commitment processes

Used in Day-Ahead Energy and
Operating Reserve Market, and
all Reliability Assessment
Commitment processes
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Table 4-6: Bid Parameters: Improved Service Procurement Efficiency (cont’d)
ISO/RTO-Specific Proposed Parameter Name and Description

ISO/RTO

NYISO

Minimum Discharge
Limit

Minimum Charge Limit

Discharge Ramp Rate

Charge Ramp Rate

Lower Operating Limit

Upper Operating Limit

Response Rates

Minimum MW level an ESR is
willing to operate

Maximum MW level an ESR is
willing to operate

Represents how quickly an ESR can respond to dispatch instructions
under a variety of operating conditions

Reflects both charging (negative
value) and discharging (positive
value) limits

Reflects both charging (negative
value) and discharging (positive
value) limits

Can represent either speed going from zero output to Maximum
Charge Limit or zero output to Maximum Discharge Limit

Can’t be set lower than 0 MW if
not bidding to withdraw Energy

Can be set lower than 0 MW if
bidding to withdraw Energy

Provided for both DA and RT
markets

Must submit corresponding
Normal and Emergency Upper
Operating Limits (no greater than
Upper Operating Limit)
Provided for both DA and RT
markets

PJM

SPP

Minimum Discharge Limit

Minimum Charge Limit

Discharge Ramp Rate

Charge Ramp Rate

Used for offering in the Dayahead Energy Market and RT
Energy market (via RT parameter
updates)

Used for offering in the Dayahead Energy Market and RT
Energy market (via RT parameter
updates)

Used for offering in the Dayahead Energy Market and RT
Energy market (via RT parameter
updates)

Used for offering in the Dayahead Energy Market and RT
Energy market (via RT parameter
updates)

Necessary to ensure ESR
dispatch within operational range

Necessary to ensure ESR
dispatch within operational range

Necessary to ensure ESR
dispatch within operational range

Necessary to ensure ESR
dispatch within operational range

Minimum Discharge Limit

Minimum Emergency
Discharge Limit

Minimum Charge Limit

Minimum Emergency Charge
Limit

Identical to Final Rule definition

Identical to Final Rule definition

Identical to Final Rule definition

Identical to Final Rule definition
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Table 4-7: Bid Parameters: Additional Parameters
RTO/ISO

Parameter Name

CAISO

Minimum Load Value

Parameter Details
Minimum sustained operating
level at which it can operate at a
continuous sustained level
Not required to be submitted
All supply and demand models
can submit values

ISO NE

Minimum Down Time

Required for Binary Storage
Facilities only
Value must be no more than 1
hour
CSF offer parameter value of 0
only (always committed)

Notification Time plus Start-up
Time

Required for Binary Storage
Facilities only
Value must be no more than 1
hour
CSF offer parameter value of 0
only (always committed)

Start-up Fee

CSF offer parameter value of 0
only (always committed)

No-Load Fee

CSF offer parameter value of 0
only (always committed)

Maximum Daily Energy Limit

Maximum amount of MWh’s
expected to generate in the next
Operating Day
Applicable to Limited Energy
Resources only
Submitted for DA Energy Market
Bids only

Maximum Daily Consumption
Limit

Maximum number of MWh’s
expected to consume in the next
Operating Day
Applicable to DARD’s only
Submitted for DA Energy Market
Bids only
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Table 4-7: Bid Parameters: Additional Parameters (cont’d)
RTO/ISO

Parameter Name

Parameter Details

SPP

Energy Storage Resource
Loss Factor

Round-trip efficiency related to
the amount of Energy an ESR
loses from charge to discharge
Used by DA market and DA
RUC

Min-to-Off Time

Time that it takes to shut down
(charging or discharging)
Applicable to all resources

MISO

NYISO

Hourly Regulation Maximum
Charge Limit

Maximum withdrawal level at
which an ESR can respond to
automatic control signals

Hourly Regulation Minimum
Charge Limit

Minimum withdrawal level at
which an ESR can respond to
automatic control signals

Hourly Regulation Maximum
Discharge Limit

Maximum injection level at
which an ESR can respond to
automatic control signals

Hourly Regulation Minimum
Discharge Limit

Minimum injection level at which
an ESR can respond to
automatic control signals

Hourly Electric Storage
Resource Efficiency Factor

Operating characteristic of an
ESR that is the amount of
increase in Energy Storage
Level for each 1 MW of Charge
Energy withdrawn by that ESR

Roundtrip Efficiency

Ratio of energy injections to
energy withdrawals
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NYISO uses a similar, but more limited approach, to the time-related bidding
parameters: Minimum/Maximum Charge Time and Minimum/Maximum Run Time
(NYISO, 2018b). Submission of these bidding parameters is not required by NYISO for
Energy Storage Resources. The optional nature of these parameters is primarily
derived from the explicit categorization of the Energy Storage Resource as a dispatchonly resource; Charge Time and Run Time parameters are more typically used for
resources participating in the commitment process. NYISO does indicate that
incorporation of Charge Time and Run Time operational limits could occur indirectly
through use of the Beginning Energy Level and Roundtrip Efficiency bidding parameters
to ensure development of feasible dispatch schedules.
The Order did provide RTO/ISO’s with flexibility to incorporate aspects of the thirteen
bidding parameters, ensuring the physical and operation characteristics of storage
resources are appropriately reflected in bid submissions. It is unclear if an extensive
use of indirect controls for many operational limits normally represented by bidding
parameters can be demonstrated to provide sufficiently robust assurances that dispatch
schedules will be feasible or that indirect controls won’t present a wholesale market
participation challenge that is unique to ESR’s. Section 4.4, below, discusses initial
Commission feedback on some of these approaches.
Several other RTO/ISO’s have incorporated unique features into their bidding parameter
proposals that are also worth noting. Both MISO and SPP have proposed use of a
parallel set of parameters for some operation limits that are specific to Emergency
Operating conditions (FERC, 2019c; MISO, 2018). This concern about distinctly
represent emergency conditions does not seem isolated to storage resources in these
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authorities; further research into the origin of explicit emergency limits within MISO and
SPP may be instructive as to why other RTO/ISO’s have not deemed equivalent
parameters necessary to ensure reliable transmission system operation.
ISO-NE has taken a unique approach to submitting information on operational states
and limits by using two derived parameter values, Available Energy and Available
Storage (ISO-NE, 2018c). These values are a conglomeration of the resource’s State
of Charge and Minimum/Maximum State of Charge limits, and are directly applied to
reporting the associated State of Charge Limits. They are also used as an indirect
representation of the Maximum Charge/Run Time Parameters. As previously
discussed, it is not yet clear how robust such indirect measure are for ensuring
determination of feasible dispatch schedules or for complying with the Final Rule
requirements (See Section 4-4 below).
Finally, three of the RTO/ISO’s have felt it beneficial, or even necessary, to implement
some form of bidding parameter related to storage resource charging efficiency. Thus
MISO, NYISO and SPP have all implement parameters reflective of the round-trip
efficiency of the storage resources (FERC, 2019c; MISO, 2018; NYISO, 2018b). In
each of these cases, submission of an efficiency parameter is mandatory and is
considered necessary to developing accurate market optimization solutions.
4.4

Participation Model Compliance Deficiencies

On April 1, 2019, the Commission issued letters to each of the six RTO/ISO’s
requesting additional information needed to further process the respective compliance
plans previously filed in December, 2018 (FERC, 2019b, 2019c, 2019d, 2019e, 2019f,
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2019g). The RTO/ISO’s are required to file responses within thirty days following the
Commission’s issuance of the letters or risk rejection of the compliance plan proposal
filings and incurring delays in implementing the tariff changes needed to meet the
compliance timeline outlined in the Final Rule.
Many of the information requests simply required provision of tariff sections citations to
demonstrate that the relevant elements outlined in the compliance plans would actually
be applicable to ESR’s. However, assessment of the requests in these letters from the
Commission can be a worthwhile effort because they represent FERC’s initial official
perspective on how the RTO/ISO’s are approach compliance with the Final Rule. The
letters may also provide a forward-looking perspective on the additional issues that the
Commission is contemplating related to energy storage, but that might not be strictly in
scope of the current Final Rule. In reviewing the Commission letters, the following
topics, often relevant to multiple RTO/ISO’s, were considered: ESR definition, ESR
participation model elements, market participation eligibility, bidding parameters and
minimum size requirements.
ESR Definition
Some RTO/ISO’s took the straightforward approach of directly adopting the Final Rule’s
definition of an Electric Storage Resource. At the other extreme, CAISO took the
equally simple path of adopting no definition in its proposed tariff; CAISO correctly
points out the absence of any prescription within the Final Rule to formally adopt any
such definition (CAISO, 2018).
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Two RTO/ISO’s did propose ESR definitions that were different from that outlined in the
Final Rule, causing Commission concerns with participation constraints resulting from
storage resource location constraints and the ability of aggregated storage resources to
participate using an ESR participation model. First, MISO included a requirement that
ESR’s must by “physically located within the MISO Balancing Authority Area” (MISO,
2018). This rightfully raises the concern about discriminatory treatment of storage
resources external to a balancing authority. Such a concern was likely raised because
of its explicit inclusion in MISO’s ESR definition, but could apply to any other RTO/ISO;
other compliance plans have not seemed to clarify if external storage resources would
subject to identical participation requirements as those physically residing within the
balancing authority territory. Second, NYISO’s definition indicated that Energy receipt
and later injection must occur at the same specified location on the grid (NYISO,
2018b). Without any clarification as to what interconnection level is relevant to the
definition, this requirement around injection/withdrawal co-location was viewed by the
Commission as potentially preventing at least some forms of aggregated storage
resources from participating in wholesale electric markets.
In both cases, the Commission has requested further clarification around the
effectuation of the localization requirements in the ESR definitions. Also, as discussed
below, while the Commission deferred issuing rules for aggregated DER’s as part of
Order No. 841, they may be using these current compliance plans as a way to probe the
thinking of various RTO/ISO’s on additional ways of addressing that challenging issue.
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ESR Participation Model Elements
As shown in Table 4-2, and allowed per the Order, RTO/ISO’s may have more than one
participation model available to storage resources. However, there must be at least one
participation model, or a combination of models, that comply with all of the ESR
participation model requirements of the Order for all potential technologies and storage
medium. Thus, CAISO was requested to confirm if any of the offered models (e.g.,
NGR, pumped hydro, etc.) actually complied with the Order requirements (CAISO,
2018). Similarly, ISO-NE will need to clarify if the combination of the Continuous
Storage Facility and Binary Storage Facility models are sufficient to ensure the overlying
ESR participation model is technology-neutral (ISO-NE, 2018c). In both case, simple
additional citations of compliance may be all that is required for address FERC
concerns.
Market Participation Eligibility
Several RTO/ISO’s have proposed limitations on market participation eligibility for
storage resources, or were silent on the ability of storage resources to provide specific
services. In one example, the Commission questioned ISO-NE’s proposal to disallow
provision of capacity in its Forward Capacity Market (FCM) by the ESR-related energy
withdrawing-DARD resource type(ISO-NE, 2018c); no such limitations were proposed
for assets capable of refraining from charging by RTO/ISO’s with capacity markets.
ISO-NE will thus need to demonstrate the unique aspects of its market systems and
processes precluding provision of capacity services by the DARD resource type.
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In a similar fashion, NYISO and PJM were requested to explain the absence of
opportunities for ESR’s to provide specific ancillary services (e.g., reactive power and
black start support for NYISO and reactive power and non-synchronized reserves for
PJM) (FERC, 2019b; NYISO, 2018b). The omissions by NYISO and PJM may simply
be oversights that arose during the preparation of the respective compliance plans, with
resolution requiring simple revisions to the tariff updates.
PJM’s response regarding non-synchronized reserves will be potentially more
interesting, especially considering its requirement around single continuous bid curves
for storage resources seeking to operate in a Continuous commitment status. As
discussed in Section 4-2 above, such storage resources would not be permitted to
provide start-up or ramp rate limitations, and are thus required to be dispatchable at any
point along a submitted bid curve for the requested market interval. This continuous
dispatchability is equivalent to requiring a continuously synchronized state for the
storage resource in the respective market intervals.
It then becomes less clear how storage resources with finite start-up costs and ramp
rates could be eligible to provide the full range of services for which they were
technically capable of (e.g., non-synchronized reserves) using these functionally
dispatch-only participation models. Therefore, there may be opportunities for the
Commission to challenge whether the fairly broad requirement for continuous bid curves
is sufficient to comply with all elements of the Final Rule. In fact, FERC also
approached this issue from the perspective of make-whole payments related to
commitment (e.g., start-up and no-load) costs, explicitly questioning NYISO if a
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dispatch-only model accurately reflects such costs as it would for generators using
existing participation models (NYISO, 2018b).
Bidding Parameters
Several RTO/ISO’s chose to implement bidding parameters that were identical to those
outlined in the Final Rule, or simply differing minor naming differences that were clearly
connected to the equivalent Final Rule parameters. Three RTO/ISO’s proposed
alternate approaches where the Commission felt the justifications provided in the
respective compliance plans were not sufficient to fully demonstrated compliance. As
discussed in Section 4-3 above, CAISO and PJM have proposed to make submission of
a large number of the bidding parameters optional, instead relying State of Charge selfmanagement and other key bidding parameters to ensure assignment of feasible
dispatch instructions to storage resources. The additional questions on the capability of
such an approach (CAISO, 2018; FERC, 2019b) seems to be an indication that the
Commission is not yet convinced about the robustness of CAISO and PJM’s proposal to
ensure provision of reliably feasible dispatch instructions.
Delving somewhat into the details of the proposals’ mechanics, FERC requested that
ISO-NE provide additional information on their proposed use the derived parameters,
Available Energy and Available Storage (ISO-NE, 2018c). ISO-NE’s compliance plan
would require provision of these bidding parameters via real-time telemetry instead of
through market interval-specific offers from storage resource owners. Therefore, it isn’t
clear how ISO-NE would be able to develop feasible solutions for future market intervals
if they are not receiving any forward-looking values for the Available Energy and
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Available Storage parameters; other RTO/ISO’s may need to be cautious about relying
solely on real-time data if the underlying parameters is also needed to establish
schedules for future market intervals.
Minimum Size Requirements
Most compliance plan elements specific to addressing the minimum resource size
requirements were themselves not controversial, with all RTO/ISO’s presenting their
proposals for reducing resource size requirements to that called for in the Final Rule:
100 kW. The Commission did use the issue of minimum size requirements to request
additional information related to resource aggregation, even when such tariff elements
were not directly discussed in the compliance plans. Specifically, ISO-NE and PJM
were both asked to explain whether resources smaller than 100 kW could be
aggregated to meet the minimum size requirements (FERC, 2019b; ISO-NE, 2018c);
neither compliance plan had directly addressed aggregated resources. Continued
engagement between ISO-NE, PJM and FERC as they resolve outstanding concerns
expressed in the Commission’s letters may provide further elucidation on the FERC’s
expected outcome from inquiries into storage resource aggregation as it applies to
Order No. 841 compliance.
4.5

Conclusions

With the filing of the Order No. 841 compliance plans by the six in-scope RTO/ISO’s in
late 2018, the planned efforts to remove barriers to electric storage resources in
wholesale markets are coming into view. The compliance plans provide not just the
proposed tariff revisions necessary to introduce the ESR participation models and

98 | P a g e

pricing for ESR charging, but also the justifications offered by the respective RTO/ISO’s
attempting to demonstrate full compliance with the Final Rule requirements. Each
RTO/ISO proposed the use of one or more participation model that a storage resource
could be qualified for, with some utilizing additional resource types that are typically
used to further define operational functions within a given participation model. Several
RTO/ISO’s leveraged efforts initiated prior to Order No. 841 becoming effective as a
basis for elements of their compliance plans; other RTO/ISO’s that might not have had
significant experience with newer storage technologies more or less adopted
participation model elements directly from the Final Rule.
Looking at the proposed participation models on a very granular basis, the RTO/ISO’s
allow varied roles for ESR’s in their respective unit commitment processes and
dispatch. Generally, some form of restriction has been placed on how ESR’s are
considered in the unit commitment process, typically resulting in consideration of ESR’s
as dispatch-only resources. These restrictions are either implicitly (e.g., submission of
continuous bid curves covering their full operational range when wishing to bid as both
energy injecting (supply) and withdrawing (load) resources) or explicitly (e.g., NYISO’s
exclusion of Energy Storage Resources from the commitment process and designation
as dispatch-only resources on Energy Markets) limit ESR’s to being available for only
continual dispatch in a given market interval.
Proposed bidding parameters were tabulated and compared to the associated
requirements in the Final Rule. Most of the parameters from each of the six RTO/ISO’s
are either identical to those indicated in the Final Rule, or differ in the proposed
parameter naming convention. However, some notable differences were identified.
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CAISO, PJM, and, to a more limited extent, NYISO proposed that submission of a range
of bidding parameters would optional. These RTO/ISO’s would then rely on indirect
control of associated operational limits (e.g., through bid curves, other operational limits,
State of Charge self-management, etc.) to ensure development of feasible dispatch
schedules. It is unclear if such an approach can demonstrate sufficiently robust
assurances that dispatch schedules will be feasible or not present wholesale market
participation barriers unique to ESR’s. Additional bidding parameters not mentioned in
the Final Rule have been proposed, including those reflecting round-trip charging
efficiency and emergency operation capabilities.
Instances where specific operational limits, especially those related to charging and
running times, would not be allowed to be submitted or respected during the unit
commitment process where identified. Such parameters are largely those utilized in the
unit commitment process, further emphasizing the need for ESR’s to serve as dispatchonly resources in the proposed participation models.
A review of the additional information requests made by FERC in early April, 2019 was
also performed, identifying some of the Commission’s outstanding compliance concerns
with the proposed compliance plans. Topics related to ESR definition, ESR
participation model elements, market participation eligibility, eligibility to participate as
buyer/seller, bidding parameters and minimum size requirements will require further
response from the RTO/ISO’s in order to ensure timely approval of the compliance
plans. Questions were raised regarding the ability of participation models with
continuous bid curves requirements, potential lack of run-time parameter submission,
and no allowance for start-up costs can truly provide ESR’s with participation
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opportunities that storage technology-neutral and reliably ensure feasible dispatch
schedules. Initial response from the RTO/ISO’s on these questions will be available
shortly, and hopefully providing a glimpse into the extent of future work needed to
ensure full compliance with the Final Rule’s requirements.
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Chapter 5 Conclusions
This study has attempted to deepen the understanding of the requirements of and
responses to Order No.841. Understanding the impact of the Final Rule presented by
the Order on the growth of electric storage capacity in the US is a timely endeavor; the
presence of new storage technologies on the US electric system continues to grow and
RTO/ISO’s are expected to begin implementation of their associated compliance plans
in 2019.
This analysis was developed using the rich sources of information related to the Order
that became available over the last few years. These sources have primarily included:
(1) the Commission’s documented history on development of the Final Rule, (2)
contents of the Final Rule itself, (3) FERC’s embedded jurisdictional claims and related
legal precedents, (4) the RTO/ISO’s compliance plans, and (5) FERC’s compliance
deficiency letters provided to the RTO/ISO’s.
Final Rule Requirements and Participation Model Effectiveness
A summary of the Final Rule that became effective in early 2018 with the issuance of
Order No 841 by FERC has been provided in this report. The elements of the Final
Rule are primarily intended to provide a mechanism that can ensure electric storage
resources are able to participate in wholesale electricity markets to an extent that is
reflective of a resource’s physical and operation characteristics. Realizing the
distinctive capabilities that electric storage resources possess relative to existing
wholesale market participants, the Commission utilizes a participation model concept as
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this mechanism. Building on the definition for an electric storage resource, the
associated ESR participation model consists of four required elements:
1. Service Provision Eligibility
2. Wholesale Market Price Setting
3. Market Bidding Parameters
4. Minimum Size Requirements
Additionally, the Final Rule provides clear compensation requirements (i.e., pricing at
the relevant nodal LMP) for specific types of energy withdrawals: those performed for
the purpose of charging ESR’s that re-inject energy back to the grid as part of later
wholesale transactions. The Final rule thus differentiates such energy withdrawals from
conventional loads and end-use applications. The wholesale nature of these distinctly
ESR-associated energy withdrawals is now definitively established so as to not unfairly
disadvantage storage resources when providing grid services via wholesale markets.
The Commission has made increasing use of resource-specific participation models in
an effort to broaden wholesale market participation. Broader participation is seen as a
path to increased market competition and, ultimately, the lower electricity rates that
FERC looks for in order to comply with the FPA’s requirement for just and reasonable
rates. Participation models can at least partially achieve this intended goal. The Final
Rule’s effect on market competition will be achieved primarily through a greater
realization of merchant value by ESR owners. Full system benefits derived from
storage resources extend beyond those revenues realized by ESR owners. Therefore,
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economically optimal levels of ESR capacity and service provision will likely not be
achieved through exclusive use of participation models.
It is additionally noted that participation models, as currently constructed, are
revenue/benefit-centric mechanisms; the models provide neither subsidization of new
technology research and development, nor any direct procurement incentives (e.g.,
procurement credits or financing assistance). Thus, exclusive use of participation
models to facilitate ESR capacity growth does not provide any direct downward
pressure on procurement costs that would further improve benefit/cost considerations
that are critical to many project valuation processes (e.g., cost effectiveness tests
detailed in the California Standard Practice Manual (CPUC, 2001)).
Order No. 841 is thus an important step towards attaining greater electric storage
resource service provision, and by extension, enabling the concomitant expansion of
renewable energy penetration. However, unilateral federal efforts alone are unlikely to
provide the stimulus needed to achieve economically-optimal utilization of ESR’s and a
direct impact on all aspects of benefit/cost considerations related to ESR procurement.
Final Rule Legal Foundations and Jurisdictional Perspectives
Realization of ESR participation model-derived benefits will be heavily dependent on the
long-term resilience of the market changes that FERC intends to implement through
Order No. 841. The Commission has proactively responded to the technological,
economic and legislative shifts through its efforts on Order No. 841. Yet, FERC has still
relied primarily on a conventional, categorical exercise of its jurisdiction over interstate
wholesale markets when regulating sub-transmission-level connected ESR’s through
104 | P a g e

Order No. 841’s requirements. The same shifts that prompted its work on Order
No. 841 are the same ones that present the Commission with increasing vulnerability to
judicial review of its jurisdictional approach cited in the Final Rule and the regulatory
regime change.
The Commission must now take greater care not to overstep its authorized jurisdiction
by inadvertently enacted regulations that directly impact retail activities of storage
resources that are simultaneously interacting in wholesale electric markets. Such
regulatory efforts by FERC risk judicial review to determine if federal actions have
unlawfully preempted the authorities clearly reserved for the States in the Federal
Power Act. Overturning established market structures, and the associated increase in
regulatory uncertainty, will drive increasing investment gaps in the development and
commissioning of electric storage resources.
An increasing engagement with the respective State authorities is needed from FERC to
maintain the momentum that Order No. 841 provides to ESR participation, both at the
wholesale and retail level. Alternate approaches to FERC’s current jurisdictional
practices will be needed to achieve this as well. For example, the efforts to date at
implementing state-level legislation and mandates associated with electric storage
procurement point to the potential effectiveness of the innovative incubation
environments provided at the state level. Such innovation can be a driving force leading
to new mature, commissioned technological innovations that the Commission is seeking
as a way to increase competition in interstate wholesale electric markets. Harnessing
best-practices and, where possible, aligning with state-level efforts can hasten the
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realization of the system-wide benefits that better reflect the full range of services
available from ESR’s.
At the same time, unintended reliability risks to the electric system can come from
market and grid performance driven by distributed energy resources (e.g., ESR’s),
forcing the slowing or outright halt to storage resource participation growth. State/local
entities that operate and regulate the sub-transmission levels of the grid need some
level of awareness of distribution-level and BTM resource interactions in wholesale
markets to ensure proper system operation and planning. Thus, the need for
cooperative federal- and state-level engagement on ESR participation will only increase
as ESR capacity and utilization increases.
RTO/ISO Compliance Plans and Initial Commission Responses
Details of the various storage resource participation models, as proposed by the six
RTO/ISO’s in the December, 2018 compliance plan submissions, were tabulated along
with associated resource types, where applicable. Some RTO/ISO’s leveraged efforts
pre-dating Order No. 841 as key elements of one or more proposed ESR participation
model (e.g., CAISO, PJM and ISO-NE). Conversely, some RTO/ISO’s had little or no
previous experience with non-PHES resource participation in the relevant wholesale
markets (e.g., SPP); such regions relied more heavily on direct adoption of the Final
Rule participation model elements.
A review of bidding parameters revealed two aspects of the proposed participation
models that RTO/ISO’s may need to resolve to the satisfaction of the Commission in
order to ensure timely approval of the proposed compliance plans. First, the proposals
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by some RTO/ISO’s to make extensive use of indirect controls as a means to manage
numerous ESR physical parameters is not yet sufficiently justified. As evident in the
Commission’s compliance letters sent to the RTO/ISO’s in early April, 2019, it is not yet
clear how the proposed indirect controls will provide sufficient assurance that feasible
dispatch instructions can be reliably issued under a wide range of operational situations.
The categorization of some proposed participation models as “dispatch-only”, or the
requirement to submit continuous bid curves across an ESR’s entire
charging/discharging operational range, represents a possible hurdle to FERC’s
approval of the compliance plans for most RTO/ISO’s. The ESR definition in the Final
Rule is agnostic to the use of specific storage technology, only requiring a resource to
have the ability to store energy for later injection to the grid. Yet, storage resources
excluded from functional participation in unit commitment processes, or limited in to
submitting either charging or discharging bids in a given market interval can provide
barriers to storage resources. These barriers can be associated with specific
operational limitations (e.g., non-zero start-up times, finite ramp rates, etc.) or
entitlement to market participation costs (e.g., start-up costs, no-load costs, etc.).
Overcoming this technology bias may be significant for some RTO/ISO’s. For example,
NYISO’s claimed market optimization software limitations may require significant cost
and time to accommodate even small numbers of storage resource that can’t submit
continuous bid curves. However, greater sharing of best-practices regarding inclusion
of ESR operational characteristics may be used to provide easier solutions to achieving
true technology neutrality for the ESR participation models; consideration of CAISO’s
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claimed ability to respect all operational limits, even with submission of continuous bid
curves, may hold valuable lessons for other RTO/ISO’s.
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